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Legislative Veto of Administrative Rules in
Missouri: A Constitutional Virus
Kenneth D. Dean*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Michael Crichton's fictional The Andromeda Strain,' a toxic strain of
virus came to earth from a space probe, initially killing all those with whom
it came in contact. As scientists sought to contain and eliminate the virus it
mutated, eventually becoming harmless, and the world escaped disaster.2 A
different kind of virus, equally insidious, has infected the constitutional
balance of power in Missouri.3 Unlike Crichton's virus, this one was created
in a constitutionally sound manner and was benign.' However, it soon began
mutating into several major and minor versions that appear in almost 180
Missouri statutes.5 The latest versions may be the most lethal in their effect
on agencies and may raise the stakes in constitutional brinkmanship.6
Similar viruses have appeared in the statutes in other states and at the
national level, creating crises in the constitutional balance of power. With few
exceptions,' all have been cured by judicial eradication.8 The virus has a
name and a mission: legislative veto of administrative rulemaking, and its
mission is to control rules issuing, or issued from, executive agencies.'
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor, University ofMissouri-ColumbiaSehool ofLaw.
The author wishes to thank the following student research assistants: Beverly Baughman, Sandra
Eastwood and Dan Coughlin. The author also wishes to thank Susan Cessac for the use of her
incredible typing talents.
1. MicHAEL CRICHTON, THE ANDROMEDA STRAIN (1969).
2. Id.
3. See Appendix A (listing the various versions of powers given to the General Assembly's
Joint Committee on Administrative Rules).
4. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.037 (1986). See also infra text accompanying notes 35-44.
5. See Appendix A for a listing.
6. See inffra text accompanying notes 417-50; see also Appendix A, Versions IVB, IVC.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 185-219.
8. Four states allow legislative veto by constitutional amendment: Connecticut, Iowa,
Michigan, and South Dakota. See Nancy Rhyme, Legislative Review ofAdministrative Rules and
Regulations, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS 3 (1990).
9. The legislative veto has been the subject of numerous articles and publications. See, e.g.,
JOIN R. BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: UNSEPARATING THE POWRS (1977); MARCus E.
ETHRIDGE, IEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION IN IMPLEMENTATION:

POLICY THROUGH POLmcs

(1985); James Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive
Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives,52 IND. L.J. 323 (1977); Arthur E. Bonfield, State
Law in the Teaching of Administrative Law: A CriticalAnalysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEx. L.
REV. 95 (1982); Barbara L. Borden, Legislative Review of Agency Rules in Arizona: A
ConstitutionalAnalysis,1985 ARIz. ST. L.J. 493; Daan Braveman, Chadha: The Supreme Court
as Umpire in SeparationofPowers Disputes,35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 735 (1984); Stephen Breyer,
The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEo. L.J. 785 (1984); Stanley Brubaker, Slouching
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Toward ConstitutionalDuty: The Legislative Veto and Delegation of Authority, I CONST.
COMM. 81 (1984); Harold H. Bruff& Ernest Gellhorn, CongressionalControlofAdministrative
Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1369 (1977); Joseph Cooper &
Ann Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution,30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 467 (1962);
Dennis DeConcini & Robert Faucher, The Legislative Veto: A ConstitutionalAmendment,21
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 29 (1984); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The CongressionalVeto and Separation
of Powers: The Executive on a Leash?, 56 N.C. L. REv. 423 (1978); Murray Dry, The
CongressionalVeto and the ConstitutionalSeparation of Powers, in THE PRESIDENCY IN THE
CONSTI1TUIONAL ORDER 195 (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey Tulis eds., 1981); E,Donald Elliott,
INS v. Chadha: The AdministrativeConstitution,the Constitutionand the Legislative Veto, 1983
Sup. CT. REv. 125; John L. Fitzgerald, CongressionalOversight or CongressionalForesight:
GuidelinesFrom the Founding Fathers,28 ADMIN. L. REv. 429 (1976); James A. Gazell &
Darell L. Pugh, Voiding the Legislative Veto: Possible Impactsfor the Administrative State, 7
GLENDALE L. REv. 1 (1985); Robert W. Ginnane, The Control of FederalAdministrationby
CongressionalResolutionsand
Committees,66 HARv. L. Rv. 569 (1953); Robert L. Glicksman,
Severability and the Realignment of the Balance of Power Overthe PublicLands: The Federal
Land PQlicy and Management Act of 1976 After the Legislative Veto Decisions, 36 HAST,LJ.
I (1984); Richard I. Goldsmith, INS v. Chadha and the NondelegationDoctrine: A Speculation,
35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 749 (1984); Neil W. Hamilton & J. David Prince, Legislative Oversight
ofAdministrativeAgencies in Minnesota, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.223 (1986); John B. Henry
11, The Legislative Veto: In Search of ConstitutionalLimits,16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 735 (1979);
David L. Howe, Legislative Review of Administrative Rules, in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE
LEGISLATION 1955-56, 165 (The Legislative Research Center, University of Michigan Law
School ed., 1957); Matthew Hutchins, Legislative Vetoes and the Administrative Process: A
Constitutional and OperationalAnalysis, 15 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 307 (1984); Frederick M.
Kaiser, CongressionalActionto Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "LegislativeVeto,"
32 ADMIN. L. REv.667(1980); Frederick M. Kaiser, CongressionalControlofExecutiveActions
in the Aftermath of the Chadha Decision, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 239 (1985); Jessica Korn,
InstitutionalReforms That Don'tMatter: Chadhaand the Legislative Veto in Jackson-Vanik,29
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455 (1992); Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76
COLUM. L. 1Ev. 371 (1976); Elliott H. Levitas & Stanley M. Brand, CongressionalReview of
Executive and Agency Actions After Chadha: "The Son of Legislative Veto" Lives On, 72 GEo.
L.L 801 (1984); David A. Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of
CongressionalPower,68 VA. L. REv. 253 (1982); Arthur S. Miller & George M. Knapp, The
Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977);
Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, the
Legislative Veto, and the "Independent"Agencies,75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1064 (1981); Frank C.
Newman & Harry J. Keaton, Congressandthe FaithfulExecution ofLaws-ShouldLegislators
SuperviseAdministrators?,41 CALIF. L. REV.565 (1953-54); James B. Pearson, Oversight: A
Vital Yet Neglected CongressionalFunction,23 KAN. L. REv.277 (1975); Peter W. Rodino Jr.,
CongressionalReviewofExecutive Action, 5 SETON HALL L. REv. 489 (1974); Antonin Scalia,
The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy ForSystem Overload, REGULATION, Nov./Dec. 1979, at
19; Bernard Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: I The
American Experience,30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1031 (1955); Bernard Schwartz, The Legislative Veto
andthe Constitution-AReexamination, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv.351 (1978); Rodney A. Smolla,
BringBack the Legislative Veto: A Proposalfora ConstitutionalAmendment, 37 ARK. L. REv.
509 (1984); Girardeau A. Spann, Deconstructingthe Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473
(1984); Girardeau A. Spann, Spinning the Legislative Veto, 72 GEo. L.J. 813 (1984); Peter L.
Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court'sLegislative
Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789; Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law
By Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1984); Comment, CongressionalControl of
PresidentialWar-Making Underthe War PowersAct: The Status of the Legislative Veto After
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The last sixty years have witnessed an enormous growth at the federal
and state levels in both the number and size of administrative bureaucracies.' Agencies have been created to implement and administer legislation
passed by the Congress or state legislatures." These agencies have been
called upon not only to enforce the laws passed by the legislatures, but also
to promulgate rules and regulations to "flesh out" the laws adopted by general
or specific mandates of rulemaking. 2 The grant of rulemaking authority has
been given to executive agencies because legislatures have often found
themselves unable, or unwilling, 3 to fine-tune laws addressing today's
increasingly complex society. 4 The fine-tuning has been left to administrative agencies, particularly where scientific, economic, or other expertise is
needed to determine how the law should be implemented. 5
The United States Congress, and most state legislatures recognized the
need for administrative rulemaking and mandated procedures to ensure due
process in rulemaking and judicial review of the product. 6 At the federal
level, the Administrative Procedure Act was adopted in 1946 and has been
amended several times since. 7 Most state legislatures have adopted their
own acts or some version of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act. 8

Chadha, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1217 (1984); John M. Conley, Note, Congressional Veto of
AdministrativeAction: The ProbableResponse to a ConstitutionalChallenge, 1976 DUKE L.J.
285; Jonathan B. Fellows, Note, CongressionalOversight Through Legislative Veto After INS
v. Chadha, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1244 (1984); Robert J. Ivanhoe, Comment, Congressional
OversightofAdministrative Discretion:Definingthe ProperRole ofthe Legislative Veto, 26 AM.
U. L. REV. 1018 (1977); William F. Leahy, Note, The Fate of the Legislative Veto After Chadha,
53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 168 (1984-85); Emily S. McMahon, Note, Chadha and the
Nondelegation Doctrine: Defining a RestrictedLegislative Veto, 94 YALE L.J. 1493 (1985);
Geoffrey S. Stewart, Note, Constitutionalityof the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 593
(1976); H. Lee Watson, Comment, CongressSteps Out: A Look at CongressionalControlof the
Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1975); Christian Volz, Recent Developments, The Legislative
Veto in the Arms Export ControlAct of 1976, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1029 (1977).
10. See, e.g, KENNETH CULP DAVIs, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 17-52 (2d ed.
1978); see also Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution: A Re-examination, supra
note 9, at 353.
11. DAVIS, supra note 10, at 152-60.
12. 1d.
13. See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 44-47

(1985).
14. 1d. See also DAVIS, supra note 10, at 152-60.
15. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 13, at 44-47.
16. Rulemaldng is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act set out in 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559 (1988). In Missouri, the procedures are set out in Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 536.010-.215
(1986). For the history of rulemaking in Missouri, see ALFRED S. NEELY IV & DANIEL W.
SHINN, ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, MISSOURI PRACTICE, Vol. 20, §§ 1.02-.03

(1986).
17. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988).
18. There are three versions of the Act, promulgated in 1946, 1961 and 1981. BERNARD
SCHwARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 32-33 (3d ed. 1991). The 1961 version has no provisions
dealing with legislative veto, while the 1981 model has provisions that have been the subject of
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While these state acts addressed the procedural devices for rulemaking, until
recently, they typically had no mechanism for legislative control of the rules
and regulations that flow from administrative agencies. Today forty-one states
exercise some form of legislative oversight of administrative rulemaking,
either as part of the acts on rulemaking procedure, as separate legislation, or
as part of specific agency enabling legislation.'
As bureaucracy grew, legislatures became increasingly concerned with
establishing mechanisms to oversee administrative rulemaking.20 When INS
v. Chadha2 was decided in 1983, it was estimated that there were almost
200 federal statutes which contained legislative-veto provisions.22 Similarly,
many states had attempted some form of experimentation with legislative
review or veto of administrative rules.' The desire to exercise legislative
oversight or control of administrative rulemaking was a common theme that
developed in the 60's and 70's.24
Lawmaking is essentially a political function. Administrators and agency
heads are usually appointed and not elected. Therefore, as rules and
regulations spewed from the agencies, there was increasing demand for
politically accountable decisionmaking.' Most agencies, once created, have
a "life of their own."" As agency-promulgated rules had an adverse effect,
actual or perceived, on individuals, businesses, and interest groups, these
constituencies complained to their elected representatives, and the move for
increased political monitoring by the legislatures began.
Missouri did not escape the national trend. Efforts begun by the Missouri
General Assembly in 197528 culminated in 1992 with a challenge by the
intense analysis and debate. See ARTHuR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING
§ 8.3 (1986 & Supp. 1990); Carl Auerbach, Bonfield on State Administrative Rulemaking: A
Critique,71 MINN. L. REV. 543 (1987).
19. See Rhyme, supra note 8, at 3; see also L. Harold Levinson, Legislative and Executive
Veto of Rules ofAdministrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives,24 WM. & MARY L. REV.
79 (1982).
20. See, e.g., DAvis, supranote 10, at 75-82; Jody K. Falk, State Regulatory Development
andReform: An Overview, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 261,283-96; Restoringthe Balance: Legislative
Review ofAdministrativeRegulations,NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (1978)
[hereinafter Restoringthe Balance].
21. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
22. Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
23. See FRANK E. COOPER, I STATE ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW 221-30 (1965); see also
Levinson, supra note 19, at 113-15.
24. Id. See also Levinson, supranote 19; Restoringthe Balance, supranote 20. The first
legislative veto provision at the national level appeared in 1932. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 969
(White, J., dissenting). The first state veto appeared in 1939 in Kansas. L. Harold Levinson,
The Decline of the Legislative Veto: Federal/State Comparisonsand Interactions,17 PUBLiUS
115 (1987).
25. Falk, supranote 20, at 263.
26. Id.
27. ld. at 292.
28. The "Committee on Administrative Rules" was created by Senate Bill 58, 78th General
Assembly, 1st Regular Sess., in 1975 and codified as Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.037 (1986)
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Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to the powers of the Joint Committee
on Administrative Rules (JCAR) to suspend or reject proposed agency
rules.29 While the particular case from which the dispute arose is still
pending," the storm of controversy that it created foreshadows likely
challenges and provides the impetus for this Article.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the constitutionality of the
legislative veto as it exists in Missouri, specifically the powers of the
JCAR.3' Part II of the Article traces the history of the JCAR and the various
types of powers given to it.3" Part III of the Article examines the experiences of the United States government and other states to determine their
applicability to Missouri.33 Part IV examines the various grants of power to
determine whether they comply with the Missouri constitution.34
II. HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO IN MISSOURI
In 1975, the Missouri General Assembly, in Senate Bill 58, created the
"Committee on Administrative Rules" (JCAR) which became effective January
1, 1976." 5 The Committee is composed of five members of the Senate
appointed by the President pro tem and five members of the House of
Representatives appointed by the Speaker. Each member serves as a committee
member during his/her term of office in the general assembly.36 No major
party shall
be represented by more than three appointed members from either
37
house.
The original purpose of the JCAR was to "review all rules promulgated
by any agency after January 1, 1976.""3 The statute also provides that the
(effective January 1, 1976). While the proper name is the "Committee on Administrative Rules,"
legislation passed afterwards sometimes refers to the committee as the "Committee on
Administrative Rules" and sometimes as the "Joint Committee on Administrative Rules." Since
it is a joint committee of the House and Senate and is commonly referred to by that title, it will
hereinafter be referred to as the JCAR.
29.i City of Jefferson Mo. v. Department of Natural Resources, No. CV191-934CC (19th
Judicial Circuit, Cole County, Mo., filed July 30, 1991). See also infra text accompanying notes
222-36.
30. As of September 1, 1992, no final action had been taken.
31. This Article will focus on the JCARbecause virtually all of the provisions relating to
administrative rule review and veto are lodged with it. There are however a few legislative veto
provisions that allow the General Assembly to act either by a one-house veto procedure (e.g.,
Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.400.5(4) (1986)), or by concurrent resolution, or by bill, (e.g., Mo. REv.
STAT. § 265.515 (1986)). The bill process appears constitutional. The analysis in the text that
follows is generally applicable to the other two provisions: one-house veto and concurrent
resolution.
32. See Appendix A for the various versions and variations of JCAR powers.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 76-219.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 220-450.
35. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.037 (1986).
36. Id. § 536.037(1).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 536.037(3).
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JCAR "may review any or all other rules of any agency,"" and further "may
take such action as it deems necessary which may include holding hearings." 40 Additionally, "if the Committee finds that any rule whether
promulgated before or after January 1, 1976 should be amended or rescinded
in whole or in part, it shall report such findings and recommendations to the
General Assembly..
,,."This language seems constitutionally sound.42
The JCAR was only charged with reviewing rules and making recommendations to the General Assembly as a whole.43 It had no power to veto,
suspend, or exercise prior approval over a rule. Rather it was designed to
serve as a watchdog for the legislature over administrative rulemaking. The
general assembly could decide whether to implement any recommendations of
the JCAR through legislation. It is difficult to see how this creation of the
legislature conflicts with the Missouri Constitution.'
The original grant of power to the JCAR has remained unchanged. What
has changed dramatically, however, is the power annexed to specific enabling
legislation which gives the JCAR power to suspend, veto, or exercise prior
approval of rules .
The annexation of new powers to the JCAR began with language that
allowed the JCAR to suspend a rule after hearing if it was beyond the
statutory authority of the agency or inconsistent with legislative intent.46
Rule reinstatement was allowed if the General Assembly acted affirmatively
by concurrent resolution.47 This language appears in a substantial number
of statutes and represents a change from earlier attempts by the legislature to

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 536.037(4).
42. Most commentators and scholars examining the legislative veto provisions have
concluded that the "review and recommend" authority of a legislative committee creates no
significant constitutional problems. See, e.g., BONFIELD, supranote 18, § 8.3.1(b)-(f); see also
Levinson, supra note 19, at 98-99.
43. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.037(4).
44. The Missouri Constitution clearly envisions the creation of committees by the legislature
to assist in lawmaking. Article m, § 22 provides in part that: "Each house of the general
assembly may provide by rule for such committees of that house as it deems necessary to meet,
to consider bills, or to perform any other necessary legislative function during the interim
between the session ....
" MO. CONST. art. III, § 22. See also State ex rel. Jones v.Atterbury,
300 S.W.2d 806, 814-19 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
45. See Appendix A (listing all grants of power to the JCAR).
46. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 36.070(4) (1986) (noted in Appendix A, Version UB),
which states:
Any such rule or portion of a rule may be suspended by the joint committee on
administrative rules if after hearing thereon the committee finds that such rule or
portion of the rule is beyond or contrary to the statutory authority of the agency
which promulgated the rule, or is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the
authorizing statute. The general assembly may reinstate such rule by concurrent
resolution signed by the governor.
(emphasis added).
47. Id.
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provide greater oversight powers to the JCAR.48 In a few bills passed in
1979 and 1980, the legislature briefly toyed with the approach of giving the
JCAR power to file a complaint before the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) to contest the validity of any rule.49 Two versions 5 of the early
statutory language were used which differ only in small details. The first
version required the AHC to immediately suspend that portion of the
challenged rule until the AHC determined, after a hearing held within 10 days,
what action to take on the disputed portion of the rule.' The second version
allowed immediate suspension of the rule by the AHC unless the agency
promulgating the rule "within three working days after the receipt of the
complaint, files an affidavit with the Commission stating that the suspension
of the rule would terminate entitlement to federal funds being received by the
state or any political subdivision thereof at the time the rule was published."52 This approach was apparently found unsatisfactory and has not
been followed since. Indeed, although the statutes still remain on the books,
it appears they are unconstitutional after the decision in State Tax Commission
v. Administrative Hearing Commission. 3
A. Versions of JCAR Powers
Missouri is usually listed in the various studies of legislative veto
provisions as a state with a rules committee having only advisory authority.
This is an inaccurate assessment.54 In fact, it is difficult to accurately
characterize Missouri's legislative veto provisions because of the various
mutations that have been created during the past sixteen years.
There are four principal versions (and several variations) of legislative
veto power granted to the JCAR'5 The first has already been noted
above. 6 The second version involves the suspension power and has two
variations. One variation allows suspension of a rule without hearing.57 The
other requires a hearing and typically requires the Committee to find the
action of the agency beyond the grant of legislative power or inconsistent with
legislative intent.58 The second version appeared in 1979 and 1980. It is
important to note that here the word "suspend" in essence, means "repeal,"

48. See Appendix A, Version f1B for a list.
49. See Appendix A, Versions IA, IB.
50. Appendix A, Versions IA, IB.
51. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 344.070 (1986) quoted in Appendix A, Version IA.
52. Mo. REv. STAT. § 344.070.
53. 641 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). That case found § 536.050.2 unconstitutional
because it gave the AHC declaratory judgment power over administrative rules. Id. at 76. The
court declared that such a grant of judicial power could not be given by the legislature to the
executive. Id. at 75. See also infra text accompanying notes 308-11.
54. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 19, at 98 n.70.
55. See Appendix A.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
57. See Appendix A, Version IIA.
58. See Appendix A, Version HB.
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"abolish," or "nullify" indefinitely. There are no time-limit provisions. The
word "suspend" as used in most other states usually means a temporary
suspension. 9 This version does indicate that the rule can be reinstated by
concurrent resolution, 6' but requires affirmative action to negate an action
already taken by the JCAR, rather than affirmative action to implement a
recommendation. No instances were found where a "suspended" rule was
reinstated by the general assembly."'
The third version simply requires agencies to submit their rules to the
JCAR for prior approval before the rules can be published and made
effective. 2 The language of prior approval, with no other conditions,
appears in only a few statutes, all of which were passed or amended in 1983
or 1984.63 Perhaps because such language would make the JCAR a
bottleneck in the rulemaking process, it was only used for a brief time.
The JCAR met on October 31, 1983, to propose new language to be
added to all bills granting rulemaking authority." That language created the
fourth version of the "virus." This version has three important variations,
IVA, IVB, and IVC. Their common feature is a deadline (usually thirty days)
for the JCAR to act after notice of proposed rulemaking is published, or the
rules become effective. 5 The more recent variations require not only
concurrent submission of the proposed rule to the JCAR, but also require that
any final order of rulemaking be submitted to the JCAR not less than twenty
days prior to filing with the secretary of state. 6 In addition, the power to
suspend (i.e., nullify) any rule at any time, whether or not originally approved
by the JCAR, remains with the JCAR.67

59. See Levinson, supranote 19, at 99-102; see also Philip P. Frickey, The Constitutionality
ofLegislative Committee SuspensionofAdministrative Rules: The Caseof Minnesota, 70 MINN.
L. REV. 1237, 1241 (1986).
60. See Appendix A, Version HB.
61. Interview with Mary Estes, Director ofthe JCAR, in Jefferson City, Mo. (Sept. 2, 1992).
Suspension of rules already promulgated and effective has apparently been quite rare. Id.
62. See Appendix A, Version IliA.
63. See Appendix A, Version III. The JCAR asserts incorrectly that the "prior approval
language" first appeared in the lottery bill, S. 44, 83d General Assembly, 2d Sess. (1984). JOINT
COmmITrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE RULES, REPORT ON THE CHANGING SCOPE AND INCREASING

WORKLOAD OF THE JOINT COMMITrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE RULES, at 4 (1986) [hereinafter
JCAR REPORT]. In fact this language had been used earlier. The lottery bill, apparently by

design, did not include the non-severability clause. Members of the legislature were worried that
if the court declared the JCAR powers unconstitutional, that clause might lead to destruction of
lottery rules. The statute was subsequently amended in 1988 (after the court upheld a challenge
to the lottery) to include the language of version IVC. See Tichenor v. Missouri State Lottery
Comm'n, 742 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
64. JCAR REPORT, supra note 63, app. 2 at 5.
65. See, e.g., Mo. Rv. STAT. § 135.285 (1986) ("If the [JCAR] neither approves nor
disapproves a rule within thirty days after the notice of proposed rulemaking has been published
in the Missouri Register, the rule shall stand approved."); see also Appendix A, Version IVB
(listing other statutes).
66. See Appendix A, version IVC.
67. Appendix A, version IVC.
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The primary differences among the three variations are that the first does
not contain a non-severability clause and, while the other two do, one goes
further. Version IVB contains a non-severability clause which typically
provides that the "[p]rovisions [of this section, act] are non-severable and the
grant of rule-making authority is essentially dependent upon the review power
vested with the [JCAR]. If the review power is held unconstitutional or
invalid the grant of rule-making authority shall also be invalid or void."68
Version IVC is a variation on the above theme, providing in addition that if
the review power is held unconstitutional, the grant of rulemaking and any
rules promulgatedunder it shall also be void or invalid.69
Due to limited staff size, annual reports have not been prepared that
summarize the actions taken by the JCAR.70 It is therefore impossible
without searching years of JCAR files to determine the exact number of rules
that have been suspended or that have been denied prior approval. It is clear,
however, from the 1986 JCAR Report, and from this author's review of recent
JCAR transcripts, that the JCAR has acted to suspend rules, or modify rules,
or prevent rules from being adopted.7 Indeed, the lottery bill passed by the
Eighty-third General Assembly resulted in numerous hearings before the
JCAR, many rule revisions and rejections, and a great deal of extra work for
the JCAR.72 The issue, therefore, is not an academic exercise concerning the

68. See Appendix A, Version IVB.
69. Appendix A, Version IVC.
70. The JCAR has only one full-time staff person who has worked for the JCAR since its
creation. She currently serves as director. A part-time clerical staff person was added a few
years ago. Part-time legal assistance is provided by'a person assigned from the Senate Research
Staff. Interview, supra note 61. See JCAR REPORT, supranote 63, app. 1 at 1. This is the only
report that has been prepared, although another report detailing activities since 1986, is also
being prepared.
71. JCARREPORT, supranote63, app. 2 at 1-13 & app. 3 at 1-6. See also Memorandum
from Mary Estes, Director of JCAR (May 14, 1992) (on file with author) (detailing specific
committee action regarding DNR rules from 1989-1992). The committee on several occasions
has suggested language changes in rules.
See also the minute book maintained in the office of the JCAR. It shows, for example,
that at its meeting in January 1992, the JCAR voted to disapprove paragraph 3 of 4CSR1507.140 and furtherto "recommend" (to the agency) the following changes in rule 4CSR150-7.160:
1. Delete the word "office" in the second line of subsection (1).
2. Delete "within twenty-four (24) hours" in the last line of subsection (1).
3. Delete the first two sentences of subsection (2). "The supervision provided to the
physician assistant working with the same office facility of the supervising physician
must be on-site and direct. Direct supervision means that the supervising physician
is on the same premises and readily available for consultation."
4. Delete subsection (3).
5. Delete the word "direct" on the third line of subsection (4).
6. Delete the last sentence of subsection (4), "Direct consultation shall consist of
contemporaneous, on-site supervision."
7. Delete subsection (5).
72. See JCAR REPORT, supra note 63, at 4-5. The report also blithely asserts that some
lottery rules "had to be redrafted." Id. at 5.
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validity or invalidity of an unexercisedgrantof power. In a short time, JCAR
power over agency rulemaking has evolved from the constitutionally safe
"review and recommend" authority, to suspension with standards, to
suspension for any reason, to prior approval, to prior approval coupled with
a "draconian" 73 non-severability clause in two lethal varieties. The JCAR has
exercised its powers, but even if it had not, the vice lies in the existence of
those powers not in their exercise.
B. Questions SurroundingJCAR Powers
The key question concerning the powers granted to the JCAR is simply
whether the grants of power are constitutional. Several related questions
follow. Is there a difference, constitutionally, between the power to suspend
(i.e. nullify or revoke) an existing rule and the power to prevent a rule from
being adopted (i.e. prior approval)? Does the exercise of powers violate the
doctrine of separation of powers? May the legislature delegate rule-revocation
authority to a committee? Are the constitutional requirements of bicameralism
and presentment violated? If it is determined that the grant of review power
is unconstitutional, what is the effect of the non-severability clause on the
grant of rulemaking authority? If the non-severability clause is upheld and the
agency rulemaking authority declared void, what of existing rules and
regulations? Which Missouri cases and constitutional provisions provide
guidance?
Before attempting to answer the first question posed above, it is
instructive to examine the experiences at the national level and in those few
states that have cases addressing the legislative veto. There is some danger
in trying to draw upon the experiences of other states because the specific
statutes and the constitutions are likely to vary somewhat from Missouri's.
However, there is a common theme-separation of powers-that runs
throughout legislative veto jurisprudence. 4 Several state constitutions
explicitly and the United States Constitution implicitly recognize the concept
of separation of powers. This theme found its way into virtually every state
constitution adopted after the American Revolution."
Therefore, the
experiences of other states have some applicability for Missouri.
III. THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Factors to be considered in determining the constitutionality of legislative
veto powers granted to the JCAR include the relevant provisions of the
Missouri Constitution, the similarity of those provisions to provisions in the

73. This word was used to describe a similar clause in Kentucky. See Sheryl G. Snyder &
Robert M. Ireland, The SeparationofGovernmentalPowers Under the ConstitutionofKentucky:
A Legal and HistoricalAnalysisof L.R.C. v. Brown, 73 KY. L.J. 169, 223 (1984).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 75-219.
75. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE- AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 136-

61, 446-53 (1969), for an excellent discussion of early state constitutions and separation of
powers.
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United States Constitution and in the constitutions of other states, and the
manner in which those constitutional provisions have been interpreted. While
the actions taken by the United States Supreme Court and other state supreme
courts are not controlling, they do provide some guidance for Missouri.

A. United States Supreme Court
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha76 declared
the legislative veto provision of section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 7 unconstitutional.78 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
said the one-house legislative veto provisions of the statute79 failed to satisfy
the requirements of bicameral actions and presentment to the President
required by Article 1, Section 7 of the United States Constitution."
The Supreme Court declared that "convenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives---or the hallmarks-of democratic government... ."" and
gave short shrift to any policy arguments for a legislative veto.82 The Court
focused on the Article 1, Section 7 requirements of presentment and
bicameralism,83 but recognized that not everything done by one or both

76. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1988).
78. Chadha,462 U.S. at 959.
79. That provision of the statute reads as follows:
[I]f during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the
close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is
reported, either the Senate or the House of Representativespasses a resolution
stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the
Attorney Generalshallthereupondeportsuch alien or authorize the alien's voluntary
departure at his own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided
by law. If, within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House of
Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel
deportation proceedings.
8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
80. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-51, 957. Similar provisions are found in the Missouri
Constitution. See Mo. CONST. art. III, §§ 21-35.
81. Chadha,462 U.S. at 944.
82. Id. at 945 ("But policy arguments supporting even a useful 'political invention' are
subject to the demands of the Constitution.").
83. Id. at 946-58. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7 reads:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If
he approves he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that
House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on
their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds
of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the
Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law ....
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment)
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houses of Congress was subject to the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment." The Court declared that it was not the form of the legislative
action that was determinative, but whether the action contains "matter which
is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect."" The
Court concluded that the legislative veto was "legislative" in its character and
effect because it altered "the legal rights, duties and relations of persons...
outside the legislative branch."86
The Missouri Constitution contains language similar to that in the United
States Constitution.87 Article III, Section 21 declares that no law shall be
passed except by bill.88 To become a law, a bill requires a series of formal
steps which culminate in a majority vote in both houses and endorsement (i.e.
approval) by the governor. 8 Therefore, if the action of the JCAR in
suspending a rule or failing to approve a rule can be characterized as
"legislative," requiring that its actions follow the form of a bill, then the
Constitution would be violated and the reasoning of Chadha would be
particularly appropriate.'
Another United States Supreme Court case, Bowsher v. Synar9' also
provides some guidance to Missouri. The Court declared that "[t]he
Constitution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the92
supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts."
In Bowsher, the Comptroller General was charged with enforcing the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Control Act,. but Congress retained the power by joint
resolution to remove him from office.93 While none of the legislative veto

shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall
take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be
repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House ofRepresentatives, according to the
Rules and Limitation prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
84. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
85. Id.
86. Id. The decision has been criticized, particularly for the definition in it of "legislative
act." See generally Peter Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the
Supreme Court'sLegislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, 794-801.
87. Mo. CoNsT. art. III, §§ 21-35 (setting out requirements for lawmaking under the
heading "Legislative Proceedings").
88. Id. § 21.
89. Id. § 31.
90. The United States Supreme Court declared:
Executive action under legislatively delegated authority that might resemble
"legislative" action in some respects is not subject to the approval of both Houses
of Congress and the President for the reason that the Constitution does not so
require. That kind of Executive action is always subject to check by the terms of
the legislation that authorized it; and if that authority is exceeded it is open to
judicial review as well as the power of Congress to modify or revoke the authority
entirely.
Chadha,462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
91. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
92. Id. at 722.
93. Id. at 727-28.
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provisions in Missouri provide for the removal of executive officers as in
Bowsher, language from the opinion about separation of powers and the role
of Congress in the execution of laws is instructive. For example, the Court
declared, "The separated powers of our government cannot be permitted to
turn on judicial assessment of whether an officer exercising executive power
is on good terms with Congress. The framers recognized that, in the long
term, structuralprotectionsagainstabuse ofpower were criticalto preserving
liberty."'94 The structural protections are the checks and balances made
possible by separation of powers. The Court went on to declare, "However,
as Chadhamakes clear, once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation
its participationends."95 Indeed, interpreting a law enacted by Congress to
implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of "execution" of the
law.96 The Court concluded that Congress' attempt to retain control of
execution of the law crossed a constitutionally mandated line separating the
powers of the executive and Congress.97
Chadha's assertion that legislative acts require compliance with the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of the Constitution, coupled with
Bowsher's separation of powers analysis (that Congress cannot achieve
through indirect means what it is restricted from doing directly, and that
implementation of legislation is an executive function) strongly suggest that
Missouri's legislative veto system is constitutionally infirm.
B. States That Have Rejected the Legislative Veto
In addition to the United States Supreme Court, the courts in ten states
and the District of Columbia have considered the procedures for legislative
review of agency rulemaking and found them constitutionally impermissible.9" These courts too have generally taken the view that the legislative
veto is unconstitutional based upon separation of powers, bicameralism and
presentment, or unconstitutional delegation of powers.

94. Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 733 (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 734.
98. See State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980); Maloney v. Pac, 439
A.2d 349 (Conn. 1981); Gary v. United States, 499 A.2d 815 (D.C. 1985), cert.denied,475 U.S.
1086, and 477 U.S. 906 (1986); State ex rel.Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 687
P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984); Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984);
Montana Taxpayers' Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, No. 47126 (Mont. Lewis & Clark Co.
Mar. 18, 1982); Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783 (N.H. 1981); General Assembly v. Byrne,
448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982); Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775 (Pa. 1987); State ex rel.
Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
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1. Alaska
In Alaska, the statute in question permitted the legislature to invalidate
an agency rule by the mechanism of a concurrent resolution.99 Apparently
the Alaska Supreme Court viewed the repeal of rules as a "legislative" act
requiring bill enactment procedures set forth in the Alaska Constitution to be
followed."(
It was argued that since the original bill creating the two- house, rulenullification procedure was properly passed and presented to the governor for
veto, the constitutional requirements were met.'' The court rejected this
approach which would have avoided the presentment problem and presumably
the separation of powers issue," when it declared:
Such an enactment would impermissibly preserve legislative power
possessed at one instant in time for future periods when the legislature
might otherwise be incapable of acting because of the executive veto. It
would also do away with the formal safeguards of article II which are
meant to accompany lawmaking. The
requirements ofthe constitution may
03
not be eliminated in this fashion.
The court also declared that the legislature can delegate to an agency the
power to make "laws" (by rulemaking) conditionally, but the "condition must
be lawful" and the legislature cannot give itself power "to function in a
manner prohibited by the constitution."

99. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.320(a) (1991). The statute states in pertinent part that "[t]he
legislature, by concurrent resolution adopted lby a vote of both houses, may annul a regulation
of an agency or department." Id. (declared unconstitutional, and replaced by ALASKA STAT,
§ 24.20.445 (1991)).
100. A.L.. VE. Voluntary, 606 P.2d at 772-73, 779. ALASKA CONST. art. II, §§ 13-14 set
forth the standard requirements for bill passage and presentment to the governor. Since the
statute was declared unconstitutional, new provisions set out in Alaska Stat. § 24.20.445 have
resulted in a six member interim committee (three from each house). The committee has "review
and recommend" authority only. Id. § 24.20.460. However, the committee may suspend the
effective operation of a regulation adopted or amended during the period in which the legislature
is in recess. Id. This suspension lasts only until 30 days after the legislature reconvenes. Such
suspension requires a two-thirds vote of the committee members and the suspension cannot be
permanent. Id. Permanent suspension requires passage of a bill. Id.
101. A.L.I. VE Voluntary, 606 P.2d at 779.
102. Id. Alaska does not have a specific separation of powers clause in its constitution but
the doctrine has been implied. See Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 534 P.2d 947
(Alaska 1975).
103. A.L.L VE. Voluntary, 606 P.2d at 779 (citing Watson, supra note 9, at 1067).
104. Id. at 777.

HeinOnline -- 57 Mo. L. Rev. 1170 1992

1992]

LEGISLATIVE VETO OFADMINISTRATIVE RULES

1171

2. West Virginia' °5
In West Virginia, agency rules did not become effective until they were
presented to the Legislative Rulemaking Review Committee (LRRC), a body
composed of twelve legislators.' ° The committee had a time limit in which
to act and the legislature was authorized to sustain or reverse the committee's
actions but was not required to do so.'0 7 The West Virginia Supreme Court
declared that when the legislature uses its power to void or amend administrative rules, it is constitutionally required to act collectively and cannot "invest
itself with the power to act as an administrative agency in order to avoid [the
constitutional requirements for bill passage]". ' The court recognized that
legislative review of rulemaking had "purpose and merit" and may be
"beneficially exercised and employed when contained within its proper and
constitutional sphere... [b]ut [the Court] must require that it be done within
the limits of the separationofpowers doctrine and according to the system of
checks and balances in our governmental framework."'"
The court noted that the LRRC abrogated the veto power of the
Governor."' In addition, the court argued that nullification by a committee

fosters legislative dominance."' First, the committee "usurps the traditional
role of the executive" to implement legislation by rulemaking and decreases

executive discretion."'

Second, the legislature can delegate broader powers

to the executive because it can control the exercise of discretion, increasing
its power in the balance of power relationship."' Third, where discretionary
power is wielded by a small group (i.e. the LRRC), "the danger of self-interest

is also maximized.""' The West Virginia experience is particularly relevant
105. For a discussion of the constitutional issues which presaged the decision cited in the
following case, see Alfred S. Neely IV, Rights and Responsibilities in Administrative Rule
Making in West Virginia,79 W. VA. L. REv. 513, 559-63 (1977). Neely noted that in 1976 only
West Virginia and Connecticut allowed "binding committee approval or disapproval of proposed
rules." Id. at 560. It is interesting to note that both states now have different procedures; West
Virginia as a result of a court decision (see infra note 106) and Connecticut because of a change
in the constitution (see infra note 178).
106. State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622, 631-32 (,V. Va. 1981).
107. Id. at 627.
108. Id. at 633.
109. Id. at 634-35 (emphasis added). The West Virginia Constitution (like Missouri's)
provides in art. 5, § 1:
The legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so
that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others; nor
shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time,
except that justices of the peace shall be eligible to the legislature.
Id. at 630 (quoting W.VA. CONST. art. V, § 1). The court's decision was specifically made on
the basis of violation of the separation of powers doctrine embodied in art. V, § 1. Id. at 636.
110. id at 632.
111. Id. at 635-36 (The court drew the arguments from Watson, supra note 9).
112. Id. at 636.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Watson, supra note 9, at 1056).
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to Missouri because of the similarity of the consititutional provisions and of
the functions of the LRRC and the JCAR." 5
3. New Hampshire
A plan was proposed in New Hampshire whereby proposed rules would
be submitted to a standing committee in each house of the legislature. 116 If
the rules were not acted on within thirty days, they would be deemed
approved.1 7 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in an advisory
opinion, declared that the proposed legislation was unconstitutional because
it delegated legislative authority to a smaller body within the legislature." 8
According to the court, "although the legislature may delegate a portion of the
legislative authority to an administrative agency.., it may not delegate its
lawmaking authority to a smaller legislative body ... .,,H
In dicta, the
court acknowledged that a legislative veto per se might not be unconstitutional, asserting that the legislature might condition the exercise of its delegation
of lawmaking authority to administrative agencies upon some form of
legislative approval." 0 There was some recognition that because executive
authority to promulgate rules comes from the delegation of power from the
legislature, the legislature might act to restrain the executive.'
The court
stated that a committee might be permitted to (temporarily) suspend a rule
when the legislature was not in session to allow the legislature time to act on
the proposed rule by bill."
The opinion is instructive to Missouri for its analysis of improper
delegation. The New Hampshire proposal would have given authority to a
committee of the legislature to approve rules."z The court said such
authority was legislative and could not be performed by a committee of the
whole legislative body. 24 The system in Missouri is virtually identical.

115. Since the court decision in Manchin, West Virginia has implemented a cumbersome
system. All rules (other than emergency rules) have temporary status and must then be approved
by the legislature after review by the rulemaking review committee. W.VA. CODE §§ 29A-3-9
to -11 (1986).
116. Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 785 (N.H. 1981).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 788.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 787-88.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 789. New Hampshire has since adopted a committee-review system with review
powers only. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:1 1 (1991). The burden of proof is shifted to the
agency when a rule is challenged judicially. Id. § 541-A:3e.
123. Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d at 785.
124. Id. at 788.
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4. New Jersey
In New Jersey, proposed rules were referred to a standing committee
which had forty-five days in which to report its recommendation to the
legislature." Unless the legislature adopted a concurrent resolution voiding
the rule within sixty days of its receipt from the standing committee, the rule
was deemed approved.'26 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that this'
procedure violated the presentment clause of the New Jersey Constitution
because voiding a proposed rule was equivalent to amending or repealing
existing law.'27 The court also declared the legislative veto an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers.'28 Because one of the primary functions of executive agencies is to implement statutes by promulgating rules and
regulations, the veto unduly intruded on the executive power to faithfully
execute the law. 29 However the court also recognized that, in spite of the
separation of powers doctrine, "[its] holding . . . [did] not foreclose all
legislative veto provisions."'30 In a companion case, Enourato v. New
Jersey Building Authority,'3 ' the court approved a very limited legislative
veto provision dealing with the rejection of building projects and leases.
There the activity required continuing legislative budget support and thus
could be distinguished from the provisions of the legislative oversight act at
issue in Byrne.3 2 The intrusion on 33the executive branch was minimal
because it was highly limited in scope.
New Jersey has a constitutional separation of powers provision virtually
identical to Missouri' s. 34 While the New Jersey court took a flexible
approach in its interpretation, 35 it nonetheless held that its legislative veto
system, which was far more restrictive in scope than Missouri's, violated
136
separation of powers because it encroached too far on the executive.

125. General Assembly v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438, 440 (N.J. 1982).

126. Id.
127. Id. at 439.
128. Id.

129. Id. at 443.
130. Id. at 448. The court declared that "(w]here legislative action is necessary to further
a statutory scheme requiring cooperation between the two branches, and such action offers no
substantial potential to interfere with exclusive executive functions or alter the statute's purposes,
legislative veto power can pass constitutional muster." Id.
131. 448 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1982).
132. Id. at 453-54.

133. Id.
134. N.J. CONST. art. III, § 1 provides: 'The powers of the government shall be divided
among three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons
belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to
either of the others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution."
135. Enourato, 448 A.2d at 451.
136. CompareEnourato,448 A.2d at 451 (no unconstitutional encroachment) with Byrne,
448 A.2d at 443-44 (constitutional encroachment).
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5. Kansas
The Kansas Supreme Court declared that the legislative authority to
modify, revoke, or veto rules created "significant interference by the
legislative branch with the executive branch and ...an unconstitutional
usurpation of powers."'37 The court held that a statutory legislative veto by
means of a concurrent resolution (not presented to the governor) violated
separation of powers and the presentment requirement contained in Article 2,
The infringement upon the power
Section 14 of the Kansas Constitution.'
of the executive was two-fold. First, the governor's power to veto proposed
changes in the law was removed by the legislative veto since the resolution
did not require presentment to him.'39 In addition, the court declared that
the action of rejecting, modifying or revoking rules and regulations was an
"essentially legislative" action because it affected "the legal rights, duties, and
regulations of persons outside the legislative branch."' 40 Additionally, the
court held that promulgating rules and regulations was "essentially executive
Once the legislature
or administrative in nature, not legislative."' 4'
delegated rulemaking to the executive, that power could not be revoked except
in accordance with the constitutionally mandated procedures for passing
laws. 42 The Kansas court noted that it had always taken a flexible approach
to the doctrine of separation of powers. 43 It considered four factors,
developed in an earlier case, to determine whether there had been a violation
of the separation of powers doctrine.' 44 The four factors are: "(a) the
essential nature of the power being exercised; (b) the degree of control by one
department over another; (c) the objective sought to be attained by the
legislature;,and (d) the practical result of the blending of powers as shown by

137. State ex rel.Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622, 635-36 (Kan.
1984). The statute provided:
(c)At any time prior to adjournment sine die of the regular session of the
legislature, the legislature may adopt a concurrent resolution modifying or rejecting
any permanent rule and regulation filed in the office of revisor of statutes during the
preceding year ....
(d) Any rule and regulation included in the Kansas administrative regulations
or any supplement thereto and any temporary rule and regulation in effect may be
modified or revoked by a concurrent resolution adopted by the legislature ....
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-426(c)-(d) (1984) (repealed 1985).
For a further analysis of the case, see Note, The New Mandamus-State ex rel. Stephan v.
Kansas House of Representatives, 33 KAN. L. REV.733, 740-44 (1985).
138. Stephan, 687 P.2d at 638. Kansas does not have an express separation of powers
provision. Id. at 634.
139. Id. at 638.
140. Id. This definition of "legislative" was essentially the same as that used in Chadha.
See Chadha,462 U.S. at 952.
141. Stephan, 687 P.2d at 635.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing State ex reL Schneider v. Bennett, 547 P.2d 786, 792 (Kan. 1976)).
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actual experience over a period of time."'45 Applying those factors, the
court first declared rulemaking an "executive function." 4 6 It then said that
the apparent objective and the actual result of the procedure was to give "total
and absolute control" to the legislature to the "exclusion of participation by the
executive branch." 47
The Kansas court's views -on executive and legislative roles are relevant
for Missouri. Perhaps more important is the finding that even under a liberal,
flexible interpretation of its constitution (which has no explicit separation of
powers provision), the retention of control by the legislature was an undue
encroachment on the executive. 4
6. Pennsylvania
In 1978, the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing was created.'4 9
The enabling legislation provided that sentencing guidelines could be adopted
by the commission after publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin and an
opportunity for public comment. 5 ' The law further stated that "the General
Assembly may by concurrent resolution reject in their entirety any initial or
subsequent guidelines adopted by the commission within 90 days of their
publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin. . . "'5 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court determined that "our [c]onstitutionally ordained separation of powers
should be understood to be [no] less exacting than that prescribed in the
The court concluded that ifthe Chadha rationale
federal Constitution."'
were applied, then section 2155 would be unconstitutional.5 3 Following the
holdings expressed in other cases, the court also declared that "administrative
rulemaking may be viewed as entirely executive in nature."' 54 However, the
court concluded that the sentencing commission was not an administrative
agency but was an agency of the general assembly.' After suggesting that
the Sentencing Commission's guidelines did not constitute "legislation," but
rather factors to be consideredby the courts in sentencing, the court asked if

145. Id.
146. Id.

147. Id.
148. Id. at 635-36.
149. Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775,776 (Pa. 1987) (citing P.L. 1316, No. 319
(Nov. 26, 1978), amended in 1980, P.L. 518 No. 107 (July 10, 1980)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 776-77 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2155(b) (1988)).
152. Id. at 779.
153. Id.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 780 (emphasis added). The statute was amended in 1986 to explicitly declare
that the commission was "an agency of the General Assembly." Id. In Commonwealth v.
Kuphal, 500 A.2d 1205 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), five of nine judges believed that the two-house
nullification provision in the statute was unconstitutional. They did not consider the sentencing
commission as a legislative agency but discussed the constitutional problems of lack of
presentment to the governor. Id. at 1215-17.
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there "[was] room in [the] Constitution for the legislature to exercise its power
by means other than passage of a law."5 6 It concluded that Article III,
Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution suggested a way for the general
assembly to override the "policy statements" of its "own creature by action not
rising to the level of a law.""'s The court read into the statute an implied
condition that the concurrent resolution must be presented to the governor
even though the words do not appear in the legislation.'
By defining the agency as a legislative agency rather than as an
administrative one, and by characterizing the commission's guidelines as
merely "policy statements" of "its own creature," and by further finding in the
statute an implied requirement that a concurrent resolution be presented to the
governor, the Pennsylvania court avoided a clear statement on the legislative
veto. 9 However, in dicta the court seemed to recognize that the reasoning
of Chadha would apply in Pennsylvania ifthe Sentencing Commission had
been characterized as an administrative or executive agency."'
7. Kentucky
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Legislative Research Commission v.
Brown,'6 gave three major reasons for declaring unconstitutional statutes that
gave the Legislative Research Commission (LRC) power to approve rules
62
beforehand and to suspend rules for periods between legislative sessions.'
The court found that promulgation of administrative rules was a constitutional
function of the executive branch of government, and the legislature had
impermissibly encroached on this function in violation of separation of
powers. 63 The power given to the LRC to disapprove administrative

156. Sessoms, 532 A.2d at 781.
157. Id. at 782. Art. I,§ 9 provides:
Every order, resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of both Houses may be
necessary, except on the question of adjournment, shall be presented to the Governor
and before it shall take effect be approved by him, or being disproved, shall be
repassed by two-thirds of both Houses according to the rules and limitations
prescribed in case of a bill.
PA. CONST. art. III, § 9.
158. Sessoms, 532 A.2d at 782.
159. Id,
160. Id.at 781.
161. 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984). For an excellent analysis of the Brown decision, see
Snyder & Ireland, supranote 73.
162. Brown,664 S.W.2d at 918.
163. Id. at 919. Kentucky's constitution provides:
The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be
divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a separate
body of magistery, to whit: those which are legislative, to one; those which are
executive to another; and those which are judicial, to another.
No person or collection of persons, being of one of those departments, shall
exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.

HeinOnline -- 57 Mo. L. Rev. 1176 1992

1992]

LEGISLATIVE VETO OFADMINISTRATIVE RULES

1177

regulations in the interim between sessions was an exercise of the lawmaking
power of the legislature and violated the adjournment clause of the constitution."6 Finally, the court declared that constitutionally, it is the duty of the
judiciary to determine whether an administrative regulation is invalid because
it exceeds the scope or intent of the statute or violates legislative intent. To
give the LRC this power violates separation of powers principles. 6
In addition, the Kentucky case presents one of a few instances in which
a court has considered a non-severability clause in the legislative veto
context.'6 The statute provided (as do the most recent Missouri statutes)
that if the LRC could not veto proposed regulations, then the executive would
be prohibited from promulgating regulations under any other statute. 67 The
underlying rationale of the non-severability clause is that since the legislature
can grant administrative agencies the right to issue rules and regulations, it

may also withdraw that grant.'68 The Kentucky court invalidated the non-

severability clause, declaring that the constitution required the .governor to
"faithfully execute" the law, under Section 81 of the Kentucky Constitution. 69 The power to execute the law does not spring from any particular
While an agency may not promulgate
statute but from the constitution.'
rules and regulations without a grant of statutory power, the constitution, and
not the statute, provides the power of execution, which includes the "adoption

Ky. CONST. §§ 27-28. Missouri's constitution is similar in wording. See Mo. CONST. art. II,

§ 1.
164. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 916-17.
165. Id. at 919.
166. Id. at 919-20. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Davis v. McCarty, 388 P.2d 480
(Okla. 1964), considered a non-severability clause inserted in a legislative apportionment act.
The act provided in part "that if any clause, provision, part or portion of the Act is finally
adjudged invalid or ineffective for any reason by final judgement of a court of competent
jurisdiction then the entire Act shall be invalidated and become null and void." Id. at 488
(quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 14, § 78.11 (1963 Supp.)). Because of a prior federal court decision,
if the Oklahoma court had upheld the non-severability clause, it would have "put an end to the
existence of [a] coordinate branch of state government." The courttherefore, declared that the
non-severability clause could not be utilized to prevent judicial review. Id.
The Superior Court of New Jersey faced a similar difficult difficulty in Samer v. Union
Township, 151 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. Ct.App. Div. 1959). In this unusual case, the statute
contained both a non-severability clause and a severability clause. Id. at 218. The court
concluded that the legislative intent was expressed in the non-severability clause and upheld it.
Id. at 220.
In Commonwealth v. Kuphal, 500 A.2d 1205, 1208, 1218-19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), a
lower court decision on the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing discussed in the text supra
at notes 149-60, the 5-4 decision did not squarely face the non-severability issue, but four
dissenters said the provision was non-severable and one concurring judge thought it severable.
167. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 919. See also KY. REV. STAT. AN. § 13.092(3) (Baldwin
1982) (repealed by Acts of 1984, Ch. 417, § 36, effective April 13, 1984).
168. Snyder & Ireland, supra note 73, at 223.
169. Brown, 664 SAV.2d at 919.
170. Id.
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and use of administrative regulations."'1 7' Therefore, the restriction imposed
by a non-severability clause is unconstitutional because it "effectively and
limits and interferes with the governor's mandated
unconstitutionally
, 172
duties."
As two observers note, this case suggests that "the issuance of administrative regulations is a necessary incident to the constitutional duty to faithfully
execute the law, and it therefore cannot be totally abrogated by the legislature."'173 Some power to issue rules and regulations in aid of execution is
therefore inherent in the executive. Because of the similarities between the
Missouri and Kentucky constitutional provisions, and because of the court's
finding that the clause impinges on the constitutionalduty of the governor to
"execute" the laws, the Kentucky court's analysis of non-severability clauses
is useful to determine the validity of Missouri's non-severability ,clause.
Moreover, Missouri shares a strong cultural heritage with Kentucky as its
original 1820 Constitution was strongly influenced by the Kentucky Constitution."
8. Other State Courts
At least three other state courts and the District of Columbia have
A
addressed the legislative veto and found it constitutionally defective.'
lower court in Connecticut held that a statute allowing a joint legislative
committee to veto agency rules was unconstitutional because it violated the
doctrine of separation of powers.' 76 The Connecticut Supreme Court
decided the case on other grounds and did not specifically address the issue
of constitutionality, although it did set aside that portion of the lower court
opinion dealing with the issue.7 7 However, the next year, Connecticut
voters approved perhaps the most permissive constitutional amendment in the
nation dealing with legislative vetoes. It allows the legislature or a legislative

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 920.
Snyder & Ireland, supra note 73, at 224.
See State ex rel. Jones v. Atterbury, 300 S.W.2d 806, 814 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
See infra notes 176-83.
Maloney v. Pac, 439 A.2d 349, 355 (Conn. 1981).
Id. at 357.
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Only three other states have
committee to disapprove agency rules.'
constitutional provisions allowing legislative vetoes.'79
A South Carolina trial court held that a statutory provision stating that
State Housing Authority regulations were "null and void unless approved by
a Concurrent Resolution of the General Assembly" was unconstitutional. The
statutory provision was a legislative function which could not be exercised by
a concurrent resolution and it infringed on the power of the executive to
enforce the law.'
On appeal, there was no challenge to the finding of
unconstitutionality, but the court held the offending clause unseverable and
declared the whole act unenforceable because to sever the clause would violate
the legislative intent of controlling agency regulations.'
A Montana trial court declared its state's legislative veto unconstitutional"82
' and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, following Chadha,
declared the Congressional
one-house veto of the District of Columbia Self
83
Government Act invalid.

9. Summary
The value of these cases for Missouri is the common theme of violation
of separation of powers. Whether or not the doctrine is explicit or implicit in
the state constitutions, the analysis is similar with respect to undue legislative
encroachment on the executive or judicial branches. Moreover, other
jurisdictions' views on issues of bicameralism and presentment, and on the
need to follow constitutionally mandated procedures when acting "legislatively," are particularly applicable because of the similar procedures required in

178. CoNN. CoNsT. amend. 18 (adopted Nov. 24, 1982) (amending art. H1)provides:

The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments and each
of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, to one;
those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another. The
legislative departmentmay delegate regulatory authority to the executive department;
except that any administrativeregulationofany agency ofthe executive department
may be disapprovedby the generalassembly or a committee thereofin such manner
as shall by law be prescribed.
Id. (emphasis added).
179. Rhyme, supra note 8, at 3. Those states are Iowa, Michigan and South Dakota. Id.
180. Reith v. South Carolina State Hous. Auth. (Ct. C.P., 11th Judicial Dist., Aug. 28,
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 225 S.E.2d 847 (S.C. 1976), cited in State v. A.L.I.V.E.
Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 775-76 (Alaska 1980).
181. Reith, 225 S.E.2d at 848. South Carolina now uses a system of review by the
committees (of the legislature) and review by the legislature. The legislature disapproves a
proposed rule by concurrent resolution with presentment to the governor. See Rhyme, supranote
8, at 17-18.
182. Montana Taxpayer's Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, No. 47126 (Mont. Lewis and
Clark Co. Mar. 18, 1982). Montana now provides that the burden of proof is on an agency if
the legislative joint review committee files a written objection to the rule. See Rhyme, supra
note 8, at 13.
183. Gary v. United States, 499 A.2d 815, 821 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied,475 U.S.

1086, and 477 U.S. 906 (1986).
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all jurisdictions for bill passage, or when legislatures undertake "legislative
acts." Indeed, most of these states found constitutionally invalid far more
restrictive requirements for rule suspension or veto (e.g., concurrent resolutions of both houses) than the Missouri plan, which allows nullification or
revocation by a legislative committee (as opposed to the full legislature).
Additionally, three states declared committee-nullification systems similar to
Missouri's unconstitutional.' Missouri's JCAR veto powers, when compared
to those granted in the states discussed in this section, appear to violate
constitutional principles even more flagrantly than the veto powers ruled
unconstitutional.
C. States Approving the Legislative Veto
1. Idaho
In 1990, the Idaho Supreme Court decided the Idaho legislature could
rescind rules promulgated by an executive department, board, or agency by
In Mead, the court noted that its
means of concurrent resolution."8
constitution provides for the separation of powers among the three branches, 8 6 and that the power to pass bills is vested in the legislature and
therefore only the legislature has the power to make "law.""' The court
reasoned that since the legislature cannot delegate its lawmaking authority to
an administrative agency, rules and regulations promulgated by agencies are
less than the equivalent of statutory law.' The court asserted that "[r]ule
making that comes from a legislative delegation of power is neither the legal
nor functional equivalent of constitutional power."' The court also stated:
"It is not constitutionally mandated; rather it comes to the executive department through delegation from the legislature."'' This reasoning apparently
led the court to conclude that there was no interference with the executive
function of enforcing the law. 9'
The court quoted approvingly from Justice White's dissent in Chadha,
where he declared that "[t]he veto must be authorized by statute and may only
negative what an Executive department or independent agency has pro-

184. West Virginia, New Hampshire and Kentucky. See supra text accompanying notes
105-24, 161-74.
185. Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d 410, 420 (Idaho 1990). At issue was IDAHO CODE § 675218 (amended 1985), which provides that "ifany rule previously promulgated and reviewed by
the legislature should be deemed violative of the legislativeintent of the statuteunder which such
rule was made, a concurrent resolution may be adopted rejecting, amending or modifying the
same." Id. (emphasis added).
186. Mead, 791 P.2d at 414 (citing IDAHO CoNsT. art. II, § 1).
187. Id. (citing IDAHO CONST. art. II,§ 15).
188. Id. at 415.
189. Id. at 417.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 418-19.
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posed."'92 The court concluded that since rules and regulations were adopted
pursuant to power granted by laws properly passed by the legislature and
approved by the governor, and since the concurrent resolution of the
legislature was also adopted pursuant to statutory authority properly passed
and approved, 93 "[t]his conditioned grant of authority [was] consistent with
the principle of separation of powers as set forth in ...the Idaho Constitution."' 94 The court countered the argument that rules have the force and
effect of law and thus can only be abolished by something of "equal dignity,"
by noting that both the regulations and the concurrent resolution spring from
a statutory grant of power.'95 This reasoning ignores the fact that the grant
of rulemaking was to a co-equal branch of government under defined
conditions and was a dispersal of power. The grant of power by the
legislature to itself to veto rules was not a dispersal but a concentration of
power.
It was also claimed that by permitting the legislature to determine if rules
and regulations complied with the legislative intent of the enabling statute, the
legislature was given a judicial function. 96 The court reaffirmed its
constitutional right to determine what administrative rules "do or do not
conflict with statutory law"'97 and framed the issue in this fashion: "The
conflict to be resolved is between the judiciary's constitutional authority to
determine whether an administrative rule is in conformance with the enabling
statute, and the legislature's statutory entitlement to determine if an administrative rule or regulation fails to reflect the legislative intent contained in the
enabling statute."'9 3 The court bluntly, and with no explanation declared
that the legislature's reservation "unto itself [of] the power to reject an
administrative rule or regulation as part of the statutory process ...is not an
intrusion on the judiciary's constitutional powers." 19 This statement is
unsatisfactory since no reason was given for it and no response was made to
the dissent's assertions that adjudication of intent is a judicial function.2 "0
It cannot be disputed that the legislature can determine whether a rule or
regulation violates the intent of a statute. It has as much right to do so as a
court. But the legislature has been provided a constitutionally sound
mechanism to voice unhappiness with administrative rules-it can pass a

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
1986)).

dissenting).
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 980 (1983) (White, J.,
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 67-5218 (amended 1985).
Mead, 791 P.2d at 418-19 (emphasis added).
Id. at 418.
Id. at 419.
Id. (quoting Holly Care Ctr. v. Department of Employment, 714 P.2d 45, 51 (Idaho

198. Id. at 420.
199. Id.
200. "If the legislature sitting in 1989 can adjudicate whether the intent of the legislature
sitting in the years when [the statutes] were enacted has been violated then the legislature has
concurring and dissenting).
become, in effect, a court." Id. at 427 (Johnson, J.,
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statute nullifying their effect. By exercising something less than statutory
action, the legislature becomes a court.20'
The court cautioned, again without explanation, that not all legislative
vetoes would necessarily be consistent with the separation of powers
concept. 2 However, it went on to conclude that the concurrent resolution
was invalid because the resolution did20not
3 state, as required by statute, that the
regulations violated legislative intent.
The Idaho decision is not as applicable to Missouri as other state court
decisions. In Idaho, the legislative veto provided that the rules could be
"reject[ed], amend[ed] or modif[ied]" by concurrent resolution of the
legislature, and then only if they violated legislative intent."6 Missouri goes
much further than Idaho because it allows a committee of the general
assembly to nullify rules for any reason at all.20 5
However, the Idaho court's view of separation of powers serves as a
counterweight to other state court decisions such as Kentucky's. The Idaho
court believes that since the executive is without constitutional power to make
rules and regulations, the legislature may condition the grant of rulemaking
power to the executive, because the only authority to make rules come from
the legislature.

2. Wisconsin
A second case upholding the legislative veto was recently decided in
Wisconsin. 206 Reversing a court of appeals decision finding unconstitutionality, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared that section 227.26, authorizing
the Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR) to
temporarily suspend administrative rules pending bicameral review by the
07
legislature and presentment to the governor for veto, was constitutional.

201. Id. (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting). See also id. at 429 (Bistline, J.,,
dissenting).
202. Id. at 420.
203. Id. at 421. Therefore, it is possible to view most of the court's dicussion on the
legislative veto as dicta.
204. IDAHO CODE § 67-5218 (amended 1985).
205. At least in the more recent versions. See Appendix A, Versions III, IV.
206. Martinez v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 478 N.W.2d 582 (Wis.
1992).
207. Id. at 586-87. Section 227.26(2)(d) provides that "[tihe committee may suspend any
rule by a majority vote of a quorum of the committee. A rule may be suspended only on the
basis of testimony in relation to that rule received at a public hearing and only for one or more
reasons specified under s. 227.19(4)(d)." Wis. STAT. § 227.26(2)(d) (1988).
The grounds required by § 227.19(4)(d) are:
1) an absence of statutory authority, 2) an emergency relating the public health
safety or welfare, 3) a failure to comply with legislative intent, 4) a conflict with
state law, 5) a change in circumstances since enactment of the earliest law upon
which the proposed rule is based, and 6) arbitrariness and capriciousness or
imposition of an undue hardship.
Wis. STAT. § 227.19(4)(d) (1988).
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The court noted that the doctrine of separation of powers was implicitly and
not explicitly recognized in the Wisconsin Constitution.20 8 It further
declared that the doctrine "allows the sharing of powers and is not inherently
violated in instances when one branch exercises powers normally associated
with another branch.",21 Separation of powers is violated, however, when
one branch interferes "with a constitutionally guaranteed 'exclusive zone' of
authority vested in another branch." ' The exclusive zone problem does not
arise in the area of executive agency rulemaking since both "the legislature
and the executive branch share inherent interests in the legislative creation and
oversight of administrative agencies. 1 ' Because the agency has no inherent
constitutional authority to make rules, it was "appropriate for the legislature
to delegate rulemaking authority to an agency while retaining the right to
The court
review any rule promulgated under the delegated power."2
noted, however, that the legislative veto provisions satisfied the constitution's
requirement of bicameral passage and presentment because the "[flull
involvement of both houses of the legislature and the Governor are critical
elements ... and these elements distinguish Wisconsin from the statutory
schemes found to violate separation of powers doctrines in other states. 2 3
The unique feature of the Wisconsin process is the temporary rulesuspension power of the JCRAR. A bill must be introduced by the JCRAR
within thirty days of suspension, passed by both houses and presented to the
governor for veto, or the rule remains in effect and the JCRAR may not
suspend it again." 4 This process differs significantly from Missouri
procedures. Wisconsin's JCRAR has temporary powers of suspension and a
bill properly passed and signed is required to uphold the suspension. In
Missouri, when the JCAR "suspends" a rule, there is actually a permanent
revocation unless the legislature acts,
216 either by concurrent resolution (in a few
instances), 215 or by passing a bill.
D. Summary
The constitutionality of the legislative veto was a matter of speculation
for a number of years until the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Chadha and the decisions in a handful of state courts over the past dozen

208. Martinez, 478 N.W.2d at 585.
209. Id.

210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 586.
213. Id. at 587.
214. Id. at 586 (citing WIs. STAT. § 227.26(2)(i) (1988)).
215. See Appendix A, Versions IIA, 1B.
216. See Appendix A. Incredibly, there is no provision in most of the Versions for the
legislature as a whole to overturn the action of the JCAR. Apart from removing the members
and replacing them with members who would vote to reinstate a rule the whole body wished to
revive, it appears the only other means would be by bill passage. See also Mo. REv. STAT.

§ 536.037(1) (1986).
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years.217 There is still much debate and interpretation of the legislative veto
and the policy arguments remain unresolved.
Contrary to the assertions
of the Mead court, Missouri is not left, as Justice Jackson observed in another
context, with a "poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable
to concrete problems of executive power as they actually present themselves., 219 In fact, with the Mead exception, the decisions provide a helpful
analytic framework that can be applied to Missouri, and they point persuasively to the unconstitutionality of the current grants of authority to the JCAR.
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO IN

MISSOURI
Professor Philip Frickey analyzed Minnesota's legislative veto provisions
investing power in a legislative committee to suspend administrative rules. He
observed that the committee had gone without challenge for so long because:
(1) the committee's powers had been used infrequently and thus few were in
a position to make a challenge, and (2) the only likely challenger would be an
agency whose rule had been suspended by the committee.22 However,
because the agency might wish to protect its budget, such a confrontation in
the courts might be avoided for years in spite of the questionable constitutionality."' His analysis of the potential negative effect on agency budgets
proved prescient. In Missouri there was recently a fierce exchange of charges
and counter-charges between the general assembly and Tracy Mehan, then
Director of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR).222 DNR had
instituted a law suit in which the issue of the power of the JCAR to veto rules
was raised.'
Mehan complained that the appropriation for three DNR
attorneys had been cut in a vindictive attempt to hinder the DNR's efforts to
fight the JCAR in court.' 4 Mehan declared: "[W]hat's going on [in the
General Assembly] is not open, honest, good government."" He asserted
that the JCAR's power "[was] clearly unconstitutional, a violation of

217. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9.
218. Id. See particularly those articles forthcoming in the aftermath of the Chadhadecision.
219. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
220. Frickey, supra note 59, at 1277. The Minnesota procedure is similar to that of
Wisconsin. The Joint Legislative Commission to Review Administrative Rules (LCRAR) has
a temporary suspension power only and must introduce a bill to repeal the rule at the next
legislative session. Id. at 1240-41 (citing MwNmSTAT. § 14.40 (Supp. 1985)). If the legislature
fails to act, the rule becomes effective at the end of the session. Id.
221. Id. at 1277.
222. See Senate RebukesMehan, JEFFERSON Crry POST TRlB., May 13, 1992, at 1, 6; Tom
Uhlenbrock, CaptialFeud: DNR DirectorCharges 'Rubber Hose Treatment,' ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, May 14, 1992, at Cl.
223. Uhlenbrock, supra note 222. See also supra note 29.
224. Uhlenbrock, supra note 222.
225. Id.
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separation of powers." 6 Members of the general assembly refuted Mehan's
claim that the budget cut was related to DNR's attack on JCAR's powers, and
the Missouri Senate took an unusual action, voting 27 to 2 on a "remonstrance" of Mr. Mehan, its harshest rebuke. 7 The battle continued after the
close of the legislative session when Mehan offered a parting shot in a
stinging editorial in which he declaredthat the legislators "[had] tried to make
themselves a unitary form of government," and strongly suggested that by
vetoing rules, legislators they may have been indirectly responsible for deaths
and higher costs to consumers." While the original case that sparked the
debate now appears moot, a new case has been filed. 9 It is likely that
debate over the role of the JCAR will continue and eventually will be decided
by the Missouri Supreme Court.
There are virtually no cases that discuss the JCAR. Therefore, Missouri
can only rely on the experiences of other states, the United States Supreme
Court, and its own interpretation of the relevant Missouri constitutional
provisions to determine the constitutional validity of JCAR powers. The
single case that touches on the JCAR sends conflicting messages.'O In one
passage the court declares, "The commission could have made our task easier
if it had adopted rules... and submitted them to the [JCAR]."'" But the
court also declared that section 313. 2 2 0 "2 does not "give the [JCAR] the

226. Id.
227. Id. at 1.
228. Tracy Mehan, An Abuse of Power, ST. Louts POST-DISPATCH, June 22, 1992, at 3D.
229. State ex reL Mo. Coalition for the Env't v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, No. 642052
(21st Judicial Circuit, St. Louis Co. Mo., filed Sept. 4, 1992).
230. Tichenor v. Missouri State Lottery Comm'n, 742 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
231. Id. at 175.
232. Mo. REv. STAT. § 313.220 (1986). This section was amended in 1988 to include
Version IVC language. At the time of the court decision it read as follows:
The commission shall promulgate such rules and regulations governing the
establishment and operation of a state lottery as it deems necessary and desirable to
fully implement the mandate of the people expressed in the approval of the lottery
amendment to article I of the Missouri Constitution at the general election in
November, 1984. Such rules and regulations shall be designed so that a lottery may
be initiated at the earliest feasible and practicable time. No rule or portion of a rule
promulgated under this authority shall become effective until it has been approved
by the joint committee on administrative rules. Any rule or portion of a rule
promulgated under this authority may be suspended by the joint committee on
administrative rules at any time. All proposed rules shall be submitted to the
committee by the commission, and if the committee neither approves nor disapproves
any such rule within thirty days after submission, the rule shall stand approved. The
committee, in its discretion, may hold one or more hearings upon any proposed rule
within the thirty-day period the rule is being considered by the committee. No other
provisions ofchapter 536, RSMo, regarding notice, publication or nonjudicial reivew
of any rule'promulgated by the commission shall be applicable to such rules. Any
person seeking judicial reivew of any such rule shall be deemed to have exhausted
all adminstrative review procedures.
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authority to maintain a continuing supervision over the operations of the
commission. '' "i Additional clarity was provided when the court, interpreting the intent of the enabling legislation implementing the constitutionally
authorized lottery, said:
We sense no purpose in the enabling legislation of limiting the
commission's authority to approve and institute any lottery game ....
Under this construction the [JCAR] is without power to forbid the
commission to institute any lottery game permitted by the constitution and
the statutes. Any contrary
holding would present substantialproblems of
4
separationofpower.2

While this case hinted at constitutional problems with JCAR powers to
disapprove some rules, it also seemed to recognize that rules had to be
submitted to the JCAR for review."
However this court did not have
directly before it the question of JCAR power. What was at issue was
whether actions of the lottery commission were supported by the statute, or
commission
rules previously adopted (and apparently approved by the
6
JCAR).2
Because of the lack of specific case precedents on the JCAR, it is
necessary to delve further into the cases interpreting relevant constitutional
provisions.
A. Frameworkfor Analysis
1. Executive or Legislative Function?
Is suspension,237 revocation or prior approval of agency rules a
"legislative" or an "executive" function? While this characterizationmight not
determine constitutionality, it is useful as an approach for analysis. 8
Because the prominent features of the legislative veto involve either (a)
suspension of a current rule, or (b) revocation of a current rule, or (c) prior
approval of a proposed rule (either by, committee, by one house, or by the
entire legislature), it could be argued that the three features are in fact
different for purposes of characterization. As to the first feature, commentators and courts have come to different conclusions about the constitutionality

233. Tichenor, 742 S.W.2d at 175.
234. Id. at 175-76 (citing Mo. CONsT. art. II, § 1) (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 175.
236. Id. at 174-76.
237. The word "suspension" in this context means temporary ineffectiveness of a rule,
whereas revocation means permanent suspension or nullification. In Missouri, the word
suspension in the various grants of power actually means permanentsuspension, revocation or
nullification because JCAR action is permanent unless there is self initiated further action of the
General Assembly or the JCAR. See Appendix A, Versions H-IV.
238. The characterization has been used in several cases as a determinative factor. See
Chadha,462 U.S. at 952-54; Frickey, supranote 59, at 1251; Levinson, supra note 19, at 10102; supra text accompanying notes 76-219.
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of the temporary suspension of a rule." 9 This feature is less important in
Missouri because the Missouri system involves permanent suspension.240
The second and third features have sparked intense analysis" and are
important for Missouri. It is clear that rules properly promulgated and
adopted in Missouri have the "force and effect of law."242 Therefore, it
could be persuasively argued that any action by the legislature, or a committee
of the legislature, that sought to rescind or revoke a rule or regulation having
the force and effect of law is "legislative lawmaking" and should follow the
constitutionally mandated procedures for bill enactment. In short, the
legislature must change the "law" by following the same constitutional
provisions it did in enacting the law, under the theory that "equal dignity" is
required.243 There is precedent to suggest that while rules may have the
effect of law, they are not law in the constitutionalsense.244 Interpreting a
statute that called for a reorganization plan promulgated by the governor to
"be considered for all purposes as the equivalent in force, effect and intent of
a public act," '45 the court declared that the plan was not law under Article
III, Section 21 of the Missouri Constitution because to so hold would violate
Article II, Section 1 as an improper delegation of legislative power.246 The
court severed the offending portion of the reorganization plan because it
conflicted with the language in another statute.247 However, the court
seemed to acknowledge the validity of the plan to the extent that it did not
conflict with other statutes.248 This case is not inconsistent with the equal
dignity doctrine for it merely states in another fashion the well-recognized

239. CompareMartinez v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 478 N.W.2d
582, 586-87 (Wis. 1992) (constitutional) with Frickey, supranote 59, at 1277 (unconstitutional)
and Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984) (unconstitutional).
240. See Appendix A, Versions I-V.
241. See generallyChadha,462U.S.at919; discussion and cases supraaccompanyingnotes

76-219.
242. Page W., Inc. v. Community Fire Protection Dist., 636 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc) (city ordinance which conflicts with a state regulation is void because it conflicts with state
"law"). See also NEELY & SHInN, supra note 16, § 5.11.
243. But cf Mead v. Amell, 791 P.2d 410, 414-15 (Idaho 1990) (the doctrine was not
followed because regulations "do not rise to the level of statutes").
Missouri agencies may rescind rules. They must do so, however, following the same
statutory requirements for rule adoption. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.010(4) (1986) ("Rule means...
the amendment or repeal of an existing rule."). The equal dignity doctrine applies to both agency
rulemaking and revocation. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.021 (1986). However, the legislature
determines by statute what procedures are to be followed in the rule-making process. While
certain due process rights are guaranteed under the administrative procedure act (Mo. REv. STAT.
§§ 536.010-.215 (1986)) when rules are made or revoked by administrativd agencies, including
the right to judicial review of agency action, no such due process is required from the legislature
in its lawmaking process.
244. Moore v. Pelzer, 710 S.W.2d 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
245. Mo. Rev.'STAT. § 26.530 (1986).
246. Moore, 710 S.W.2d at 421-22 (citing MO. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1945)).
247. Id.
248. Id.
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doctrine that rules must conform with their statutory authorization, and cannot
change the enabling statute or other statutes.249
Missouri courts have long recognized that the legislature can delegate
authority to the executive branch to issue rules and regulations to aid in the
administration or enforcement of a statute.250 These statutes are not
unconstitutional delegations of legislative power as long as the legislature
provides guidance to the agency in the statute.
The question posed,
therefore, is whether rulemaking is an "executive" function because it is
performed by an executive agency, or whether it is a legislative function that
is permissively delegated to an executive agency. Does the delegation, with
guidance, transmute what was "legislative" into something that is now
"executive?" The cases do not clearly answer these questions. The Chadha
court asserted that the legislative veto was "legislative in its character and
effect" and that rulemaking was "executive." 2 In Bowsher, the court went
further and said that once authority was given to the executive to accomplish
a task, the participation of Congress in execution ended and Congress could
control execution only "indirectly" by passing new laws.253 While these
cases are not controlling for Missouri, they are persuasive authority because
the Missouri Constitution seems to recognize, at least by implication, that
administrative rulemaking is an executive function. Article 4, dealing with the
executive department, provides: "All rules and regulations of any board or
other administrative agency of the executive department, except those relating
to its organization and internal management, shall take effect not less than 10
days after the filing thereof in the office of the secretary of state." 25 4 If

249. Id. See also NEELY & SHINN, supranote 16, §§ 6.01, 7.23; SCHWARTZ, supra note
18, § 4.4.
250. Ketring v. Sturges, 372 S.W.2d 104, 109 (Mo. 1963)) ("[s]uch a grant is in no respect
an improper delegation of power"). In Ketring, the court stated, "Where ...legislature has
established a sufficiently definite policy, standard, or rule it may, without violating the rule
prohibiting the delegation of legislative power, authorize an administrative officer or body to
adopt and enforce rules. . . to carry out the purpose of the legislature." Id. (quoting 73 C.J.S.
PublicAdministrativeBodies and Procedure§ 32 (1951)).
251. State ex rel. Priest v. Gunn, 326 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Mo. 1959) (en banc) ("ft]he
legislature may enact the basic purpose or rule, leaving matters of detail in administering the act
to the board or executive, although an exercise of discretion in the latter may thus be involved").
252. Chadha,462 U.S. at 953 n.16. The Court notes that while the Federal APA (5 U.S.C.
§ 551(4)) defines rule as "an agency statement ...to ...prescribe law or policy" the executive
does not exercise "legislative" power. The executive acts under prescribed legislative authority
subject to judicial review and Congressional power to modify or revoke the authority. Id. The
Missouri definition of a rule is the same. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.010(4) (1986).
There are Missouri cases, however, that specifically state that "[tjhe power to formulate
rules to effect a policy of statute is legislative." Missouri Hosp. Ass'n v. Missouri Dep't of
Consumer Affairs, Regulation & Licensing, 731 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987);
Missourians for Separation of Church & State v. Robertson, 592 S.W.2d 825, 841 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979).
253. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986). See also supra text accompanying
notes 98-183 for similar holdings of state courts.
254. MO. CONST. art. IV,§ 16. This was a new provision not found in earlier constitutions.
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rulemaking is viewed as an executive function, then legislatively retained
control of the process would represent an intrusion on the executive's
constitutionalpower."5
When the legislature acts by exercising a legislative veto, is that act
"legislative" and thus subject to the constitutional mandates for bill passage?
The cases suggest an affirmative answer. In fact, as one observer has noted
about Chadha, if "an exercise of the veto was not a 'legislative' act, then
'
perhaps the House had no business exercising it at all."256
The other
question that remains is whether the legislative veto is an executive act
because it deals with an executive function, and is therefore not subject to the
same constitutional mandates for bill passage. The fact that the constitution
does not address this except for the general proscription of article II section
1, does not necessarily mean the legislature could not act by means of a
statutory legislative veto. However, the constitutional issue of undue
encroachment by the legislature on the executive branch would still remain.
As to prior approval of a rule, one view is that it is not lawmaking, or
legislative, and thus not subject to the requirement for bill passage." 7 The
argument is that because proposed rules do not become effective and thus do
not have the force and effect of law until a certain point in time-in Missouri
at least ten days after filing-before that time they have no legal effect.5
The claim is that prior approval of a rule is the equivalent of failure by one
or both houses of the legislature to enact a bill.2 9 Such an analogy is
untenable for Missouri because (1) the legislature, through the JCAR, has
acted,and (2) "but for" the action of the JCAR the proposed rule would have
become effective and would have had the force and effect of law.'
While
it is true that proposed bills do not become law unless the legislature acts,

See also Mo. CONST. art. IV, §§ 45-46 (giving the Conservation Commission implied power to
make rules and regulations).
255. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 734. See also supratext accompanying notes 161-74 for similar
holdings of a state court.
256. Richard I. Goldsmith, INS v. Chadha and the Non-Delegation Doctrine: A
Speculation, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 749, 753 (1984).
257. See William J. Pohlman, The Continued Viability of Ohio Procedurefor Legislative
Review ofAgency Rules in the Post-ChadhaEra, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 270 (1988); see also
Chadha,462 U.S. at 958 n.23 (discussing prior approval of a rule); Snyder & Ireland, supra note
73, at 220.
258. Pohlman, supra note 257, at 270. See also supra note 253.
259. Pohlman, supra note 257, at 270.
260. One court has asserted that "[a] proposedregulation still nascent affects neither the
parties in interest to an administrative proceeding or [sic] the court on judicial review." St. Louis
Christian Home v. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights, 634 S.W.2d 508, 515 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) (emphasis added). But this statement was made in connection with the effect of the
proposed rule on a court proceeding that had already been decided. The court discussed the
important bearing of the procedure for notice and comment on the final rule. This situation
differs siguificantly from the JCARprocess because the agency may already have decided on the
final rule. The JCAR prevents that rule from taking effect, even though it may have already
passed through the notice and comment process. See, e.g., Appendix A, Version IVC (requiring
notice offinal order of rulemaking to be filed with the JCAR).
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rules, before the advent of the JCAR, took on the force of law without
legislative action. Since legislative action is required to prevent a rule from
becoming law, prior approval has the attributes of a legislative act.
2. Separation of Powers
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, Missouri's constitution, explicitly rather
than implicitly recognizes separation of powers:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments-the legislative, executive and judicial-each of which shall be
confided to a separate magistracy, and no person or collection of persons,
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those
departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the
others; except
in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or
2 61
permitted.

This provision has remained substantially unchanged since the original 1820
Missouri Constitution.262 Missouri cases have consistently recognized that,
according to the constitution, no branch shall exercise "any power properly
belonging" to another. But Missouri courts have not strictly demarcated the
line dividing the branches.
Courts have recognized that "quasi judicial"
power can be granted to administrative agencies 26 and certain "legislative"
powers may be delegated to the executive branch.
In State Tax Commission v. Administrative HearingCommission2 the court embraced a view of
constitutional interpretation, expounded by some United States constitutional
scholars. According to this view, one should look not to any particular clause
in the Constitution but to the Constitution as a whole to determine the role of
the various branches of government.2 67 The Missouri Supreme Court

261. Mo. CoNsT. art. II, § 1. See supra text accompanying notes 75-205 for similar
provisions in other state constitutions where the legislative veto has been found unconstitutional.
262. Mo. CoNsT. of 1820, art. II.
263. Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W.2d 977, 987 (Mo. 1937) (en bane) (emphasis added). The
proper meaning of the word is "solely or exclusively." The constitutional language has "always
been liberally construed." Id. See also State ex rel. Manion v. Dawson, 225 S.W. 97, 100 (Mo.
1920) (en bane) ('The line of demarcation between legislative, executive, and judicial functions
is not easy to draw. These functions shade into one another as imperceptibly as the mountain
merges into the valley, or the river into the sea.").
264. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Weinstein, 322 S.W.2d 778, 784 (Mo. 1959)
(en bane). See also State Tax Comm'n v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n, 641 S.W.2d 69 (Mo.
1982) (en banc).
265. State ex rel. Wagner v. St. Louis County Port Auth., 604 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1980) (en
bane). See generallyNEELY & SHINN, supra note 16, §§ 2.02 & 2.03.
266. 641 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
267. See Frickey, supra note 59, at 1265-66, where he briefly discusses the concepts of
"structural due process" and "due process of lawmaking," expounded by Lawrence H. Tribe,
Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 269 (1975) and Hans A. Linde, Due
Processof Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).
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declared that "a careful study of the whole Constitution [would]... demonstrate that it was not the purpose to make a total separation of these three
powers." '68 The court further observed that "[f]rom a pragmatic standpoint
it is obvious that some overlap of functions necessarily must occur. The
complexity of modem government demands the delegation of some administo executive agencies because of their
trative and decisional authority
2 69
particular areas of expertise.
However, the court has also regularly declared that, unlike the United
States Constitution, the Missouri Constitution does not give a grant of power
to the legislature so much as act as a limitation. The court has asserted that
"except for the restrictions imposed by the state constitution, the power of the
state legislature is unlimited and practically absolute.""27 While restrictions
on the legislature must be expressed in the constitution or clearly implied from
its provisions,27' those restrictions will be narrowly construed. 2
Legislative enactments are to be held as constitutional when it is "reasonably
possible to do so."273 Nonetheless, it is clear that the whole constitution
including Article II (separation of powers), Article III (the legislature), Article
IV (the executive), and Article V (the judiciary) all serve as restrictions on the
legislative power.
Missouri's constitutional separation of powers provision is similar to that
found in several other states. The provision was incorporated into the 1820
constitution in much the same way that the language was incorporated in other
constitutions of the time.274 At the time of the American Revolution, the
colonies feared the powers of the British executive or "governors. 2 75 For
a short period of time immediately after the Revolution, many of the new
states adopted constitutions that gave virtually all power to the legislative body
and little or no power to the executive.276 Additionally, those early states
viewed "separation of powers" as a way of "justifying an isolation of the
legislature and the judiciary from what was believed to be the corrupting

268. State Tax Comm 'n, 641 S.W.2d at 74 (emphasis added) (quoting Rhodes v. Bell, 130
S.W.465, 468 (Mo. 1910)).
269. Id.
270. Danforth ex rel. Farmers Elec. Coop. Inc. v. State Envtl. Improvement Auth., 518
S.W.2d 68, 72 (Mo. 1975) (emphasis added). See also Dalton ex rel. Holekamp v. Holekamp
Lumber Co., 340 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Mo. 1960) (en bane); State ex rel. Jones v. Atterbury, 300
S.W.2d 806, 810 (Mo. 1957) (en bane); Hickey v. Board of Educ. of the City of St. Louis, 256
S.W.2d 775, 778 (Mo. 1953); Kansas City v. Fishman, 241 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Mo. 1951); State
v. Shelby, 64 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Mo. 1933) (en banc). But cf State ex rel. Harvey v. Wright,
158 S.W.823, 825 (Mo. 1913) (unlike the power of the legislature, the powers of the executive
are a grantof power, not a limitation).
271. See, e.g., Shelby, 64 S.W.2d at 271.
272. Brown v. Morris, 290 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Mo. 1956) (en banc).
273. Simpson v. Kalcher, 749 S.W.2d 386, 391 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
274. See, e.g., Atterbury, 300 S.W.2d at 814-15.
275. WOOD,supra note 75, at 138-61.

276. Id.
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influence of executive power. ''17 This early concept of separation of
powers changed rapidly in the immediate post-revolutionary years. The
experience with the early constitutions taught the states that greater power
should be given to the executive and the judiciary to check excesses of the
legislatures." 8 Thomas Jefferson, speaking of the Virginia Constitution,
declared that concentration of the three powers "in the same hands is precisely
'
the definition of despotic government."279
Therefore, the new or revised
constitutions that emerged in that period began to refine the concept of
separation of powers; one where recognition was given to a system of checks
and balances. 8 Moreover, there was increased recognition that just as the
legislature represented the will of the people, so too did the elected executive
" ' While the general concept of separation of powers is
and the judiciary.28
limited by the particular provisions in any state constitution, and the
interpretations given to this concept by the courts of the state, the common
theme is to preserve the doctrine whether that doctrine has been strictly or
liberally construed. 82
a. Strict or LiberalInterpretation
Regardless of whether the Missouri Constitution is interpreted in strict or
liberal fashion, the powers given to the JCAR cross the line between
"legislative" and "executive" powers. It makes no difference if the functions
performed by the JCAR are characterized as legislative or executive. The
characterization should not save the powers from unconstitutionality.
Moreover, members of the general assembly may not hold "any lucrative
office or employment under the United States, this state or any municipality
thereof' during their tenure. 8 If the senators and representatives who serve
on the JCAR are characterized as "executive" because rulemaking is
"executive," the constitution would seem to require termination of their tenure
as members of the general assembly, because the constitution further provides
that "[w]hen any senator or representative accepts any office or employment
under the United States, this state or any municipality thereof, his office shall
thereby be vacated ... "284 Nowhere in the constitution is the legislature
given the power to appoint executive officials.28 We must conclude that the
JCAR is a legislative body. If it performs a "legislative" function, it acts in

277. Id. at 449.
278. Id. at 451-53.
,279. Id. at 451.
280. Id. at 450.
281. Id. at 453.
282. See supra text accompanying note 184; see also State ex rel Danforth v. Banks, 454
S.W.2d 498, 500 (Mo. 1970) (en bane), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971), where the court
declared that the doctrine was "vital to our form of government."
283. MO. CONST. art. III, § 12.
284. Id.
285. However, the senate does exercise advice and consent on some appointments. Id. at
art. IV, § 17.
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violation of the constitutional mandates for bill passage.2" 6 If it performs
"executive" functions it intrudes on the executive. But is that intrusion
constitutionally impermissible?
b. Encroachment on Executive Functions
According to the Missouri Constitution, "The governor shall take care
that the laws are distributed and faithfully executed, and shall be a conservator
While few Missouri cases have
of the peace throughout the state."28"
defined "execute," there is authority to suggest that when a function has been
delegated to the executive and is "judicial" in nature (and therefore, by
analogy, legislative), it becomes an executive function.288 For example,
State Tax Commissionrecognizes that executive agencies "may exercise 'quasi
judicial' powers that are 'incidental and necessary to the proper discharge' of
their administrative functions even though by doing so they are at times
Moreover, State v.
determining questions of a 'purely legal nature."' 2
Cushman29 recognizes that the executive may not be delegated naked
legislative power but if the General Assembly establishes a "sufficiently
definite policy" the executive may make rules and regulations relating to the
29
"administration or enforcement of the law.""
The court went on to declare:
"In other words, administrative power, as distinguished from legislative power,
constitutionally may be delegated by the general assembly."2 Rulemaking
is an administrative power. 2 3 It remains administrative even though it
But discretion is not unbridled
requires an "exercise of discretion."'2
because rules must spring from within the structures of the statute and must
relate to it.295 The legislature sets the overall policy and limits the scope
and purpose of the rulemaking power.296 By doing so, it does not give away
its lawmaking power because it has narrowed the scope of executive action to
constitutionally acceptable limits.29 '
Rulemaking, therefore, becomes an adjunct to law enforcement and
execution, clearly executive functions.298
In Rhodes v. Bell,299 the

286. Id. at art. III, §§ 21-33. See also supra note 259 and accompanying text.
287. Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (emphasis added).
288. State Tax Comm'n, 641 S.W.2d at 75.
289. Id. (quoting Liechty v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 162 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Mo. 1942)).
290. 451 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1970).
291. Id. at 20.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. State ex rel. Priest v. Gunn, 326 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
295. Id.
296. See, e.g., Noss v. Abrams, 787 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
297. The boundaries of those limits are wide. In Cushman the guidelines for the power
granted were "reasonable standards and specifications." State v. Cushman, 451 S.W.2d 17, 18
(Mo: 1970).
298. Mo. CONST. art. IV,

§ 2.

299. 130 S.W. 465 (Mo. 1910).
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Missouri Supreme Court stated: "It is still more difficult to discriminate in
particular cases between what is properly legislative, and what are properly
executive duties. The authority that makes the laws has large discretion in
determining the means through which they shall be executed."'' However,
the court went on to note that while the legislature's ability "to prescribe a
rule of action [i.e. law] properly belongs to the lawmaking power," it was
"within the realm of the branch implementing the law to supplement the
legislation."3' ' Once the legislature has acted by setting policy guidelines
and parameters, filling in the details through rulemaking is an executive
function and not a function of the legislative branch.3 2 It is constitutionally
impermissible interference for the legislature as a whole to thwart executive
rulemaking without going through the bill enactment process. It is even more
repugnant to allow a small group of legislators to become "super-administrators."
Other courts have determined that rulemaking is an executive function
and the legislative veto too much of an encroachment. 3 Notably Bowsher
defined execution of the law as "interpreting a law enacted by Congress to
implement the legislative mandate."30" Another writer discussing Missouri's
"conclusion [was] logically consistent with the
JCAR declared that Bowsher's
30 5
Missouri Constitution."

c. Encroachment on Judicial Functions
It is also been asserted that the legislative veto is an invalid usurpation
of judicial power. 6 This argument is particularly compelling where the

300. Id.-at 468 (quoting THOMAS M.

COOLEY,

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 138 (4th

ed.)).
301. Id. at 469. While this case involved legislative encroachment on the powers of the
judiciary, its reasoning is equally applicable to encroachment on executive powers.
302. State v. Cushman, 451 SAV.2d 17, 21 (Mo. 1970).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 76-184.
304. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
305. Scott Welman, Comment, Joint Committee on Administrative Rules: The Missouri
Legislature'sDisregardforthe Missouri Constitution, 58 UMKC L. REV. 113, 120 (1989).
306. Id. at 117. See also supra notes 76-184 for cases discussing this assertion. It could
be argued that the Mo. CONsT. art. V § 18 (art. V, § 22 of the 1945 Constitution was amended
in 1976 and is now art. V, § 18) implies that only the courts have review power over rules:
Section 18. All final decisions, findings, rules and orders of any administrative officer or body existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or
quasi-judicial and affect private rights, shall be subject to direct review by the courts
as provided by law; and such review shall include the determination whether the
same are authorized by law, and in cases in which a hearing is required by law,
whether the same are supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the
whole record. Unless otherwise provided by law, administrative decisions, findings,
rulesand orders subject to review under this section or which are otherwise subject
to direct judicial review, shall be reviewed in such manner and by such court as the
supreme court by rule shall direct and the court so designated shall, in addition to
its other jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to hear and determine any such review
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statute provides that a rule may be suspended if the JCAR "finds that such rule
or portion of the rule is beyond or contrary to the statutory authority of the
agency which promulgated the rule or is inconsistentwith the legislative intent
of the authorizing statute."3" 7 Traditionally, courts have performed the
function of interpreting law and determining legislative intent. In State Tax
Commission, the court said: "The declaration of the validity or invalidity ''3of°
statutes and administrative rules thus is purely a judicial function. s
However, this case involved a grant of judicial power to the executive. Can
the legislature itself exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions?
There are cases hold that an act of the General Assembly granting a
divorce is unconstitutional,3" as are acts directing courts to vacate a contract. 10 These acts unconstitutionally encroach on judicial power. Nor can
the General Assembly construe the constitution " or declare by bill the
meaning of a prior statute giving it retroactive effect."' Nonetheless, the
General Assembly clearly has a right to "interpret" law because it has
lawmaking power and power to change the law. These powers issue from the
people via the Constitution. But the constitutionally approved method of
interpretation requires a change in the law to be made by passage of a bill
modifying the offending rule or statute.313 In this sense the legislature is an
"interpreter" of law.314 However, when a small group of legislators is
charged with interpreting whether an agency rule exceeds the scope of

proceeding.
(emphasis added).
However, the language seems to suggest some other meaning for the word "rules" than that
normally given. Additionally, the word "rules" is modified by the phrase "which are judicial or
quasi-judicial and affect private rights." The definition of rule in Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 536.010(4)(b), (d) (1986), also suggests a different meaning although there is an assertion to
the contrary in at least one case. See State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Weinstein, 322
S.W.2d 778, 784 (Mo. 1959) (en banc) ("[tihe debates in the Constitutional Convention on the
adoption of Sec. 22, Art. V, [note: this is now § 18 of art V] show that it was intended to apply
...to quasi-legislative functions of other agencies .... In fact, by its very terms Sec. 22, Art.
V, includes 'rules' which could only be legislative.") (emphasis added).
307. Mo REv. STAT. § 36.070 (1986) (emphasis added). See Appendix A, Version IB.
308. State Tax Comm'n, 641 S.W.2d at 75 (emphasis added).
309. Rickeson v. Simmons, 47 Mo. 20, 26 (1870); Bryson v. Bryson, 44 Mo. 232, 233

(1869).
310. Butler v. Chariton County Court, 13 Mo. 112, 116-17 (1850).
311. State ex rel. Dawson v. Falkenhainer, 15 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Mo. 1929) (en banc);
Householder v. City of Kansas, 84 Mo. 488, 496 (1884).
312. McNichol v. United States Mercantile'Reporting Agency, 74 Mo. 457, 471 (1881).
313. MO. CONST. art. I, §§ 21-33.
314. See, e.g., Bader Realty & Investment Co. v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 217 S.W.2d
489, 493 (Mo. 1949) (en banc) (The court observed: "What is for public good and what are
public purposes and uses... are matters for legislative determination. Those legislative bodies
within their constitutionaland statutorypowersmay experiment. Courts determine questions of
power not policy.") (emphasis added).
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statutory authorization, or violates the intent of the legislature, that group has
taken on the traditional trappings of a court.3 5
While the U.S. Supreme Court's role in ascertaining legislative intent has
been criticized by some justices, notably Justice Scalia, and has also been
criticized by scholars and other judges, on the grounds that such intent is
virtually undiscoverable," 6 Missouri courts have traditionally assumed the
task of determining legislative intent when interpreting statutes. 1 7 In fact,
the role is implied in the statutes.3"' To accomplish this task, courts may
look at other laws in order to determine the intent of the statute. 1 9
However, a legislator's statement of the legislative intent may not be proper
evidence to consider and can be denied admissibility. 3 0 The fact that the
judiciary determines legislative intent does not prevent the legislature from
also making that determination. Clearly one reason the legislature might
amend or repeal legislation, or amend or repeal administrative rules, is that in
its collective wisdom, the laws or rules violate the intent of the legislative
body. However it is a current legislature determining what apriorlegislature,
often composed of different individuals, meant.32' It is unrealistic to assume

315. State Tax Comm'n, 641 S.W.2d at 75. See also Frickey, supra note 59, at 1251-52
n.68.
316. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice,
74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1984) (analyzing the arguments against legislative intent and concluding
that the search for legislative intent is a valid role for the courts.).
317. See, e.g., In re Estate of Tompkins v. Carpenter, 341 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Mo. 1960)
That rule is exercised, however, only when the words of the statute are not clear on their face,
Commerce Bank v. Missouri Div. of Fin., 762 S.W.2d 431, 433-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
318. See, e.g., Mo. RV. STAT. § 1.020 (1986) (sets forth certain definitions and provides
that these definitions shall be used unless "plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature")
(emphasis added).
319. Weber v. Missouri State Highway Comm'n, 639 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Mo. 1982).
320. Pipe Fabricators, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 654 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo. 1983) (en
bane). There are cases allowing affidavits of legislators and according them some weight where
the statute is ambiguous. See Commerce Bank, 762 S.W.2d at 435.
321. See Bruff& Gellhor, supra note 9, at 1419.
One other factor affected the political accountability of the veto process. In
all the cases studied except that of the FEA, Congressmen characterized their role
as limited to reviewing the legality of the agency's rule, that is, its conformity with
statutory purpose. Nevertheless, in all cases congressionalreview was primarily
based on policy. The reason is not hard to divine: the traditional and constitutional
role of a Congress is the formulation and alternation of policy. Moreover, a major
reason for imposition ofveto authority has been the indecision of Congress on policy
issues, and a desire to check the agency's later resolution of them. Members of
Congress are unaccustomed, and the institution is ill-equipped, to make a restrained
and judicious examination of a rule's subservience to statutory purpose. Yet
Congress' profession, despite these institutional realities, to review rules only for
conformity with statutory intent has serious implications for the political accountability of the veto process. Review on the putative basis of legality implies that
Congress is forming no new policy but is merely making sure that the conditions of
the original delegation are met. The result is that veto resolutions receive less public
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that current political considerations do not play a primary role in that
determination.3" Legislators are supposed to make political decisions.
They live in a political world that involves negotiation and compromise, and
acute awareness of constituent demands. They are not in a better position to
determine intent than the judiciary. The problem is exacerbated when the
legislature delegates intent-determining power to a group of ten of its
members. 3" When the legislature acts as a whole body it is at least
reflective of a majority of all the people. When it acts as a roup of ten (or
even of four since a majority (six) constitutes a quorum)3 4 it puts those
members in the role of judges. They are not representative of all the people,
and are more likely to be subject to the political pressures of their individual
constituents." They lack the judicial insulation necessary for dispassionate
decisions. Granting the JCAR power to determine whether rules conform with
statutory authority and legislative intent is a significant encroachment on the
powers of the judiciary.
Perhaps out of concern over problems of constitutional encroachment,
changes were made in later versions of the "virus," removing any standards
for the JCAR to follow when nullifying rules326 primarily based on policy.
Ironically, the new variations may be on more solid constitutional footing,
precisely because there are no standards for JCAR action.327 This remarkable discretionary power probably would not be tolerated if an executive
agency was exercising it,328 and the JCAR should not be permitted to
exercise it. The Missouri Supreme Court has asserted that only it has the

visibility and less attention from members of Congress outside the oversight
committees than, as policy decisions, they deserve.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
322. Id.
323. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.037 (1986); BONFiELD, supra note 18, at 508;
Appendix A, Versions H-V.
324. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.037(2) (1986).
325. This point is forcefully made by Frickey, supra note 59, at 1262. See also Carl
Auerbach, Administrative Rulemaking in Minnesota, 63 MINN. L. REV. 151, 233 (1979):
A major problem with legislative committee veto or suspension-of rules is that it
lends itself to undemocratic political decision. Only six legislators in Minnesota
need to be persuaded and a rule will be suspended. Groups that unsuccessfully
opposed the policies embodied in the basic legislation may, therefore, be encouraged
to try to turn their defeat into victory by exerting pressure on the legislative review
committee to suspend agency rules implementing the legislation.
326. See Appendix A, Versions HA, IVA-C. State Tax Commission v. Administrative
Hearing Commission, 641 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1982), was decided in 1982; significant changes were
made in the wording when the "legislative intent" and "statutory authority" standards were
deleted in 1983.
327. See Appendix A, Version IVB. See Levinson, supranote 19, at 101-02. Levinson
notes that when a committee is given temporary suspension power with specific guidelines for
action, it may be more constitutionally sound. Id. Missouri however, uses temporary, not
permanent, suspension.
328. See Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 536.021 (1986); NEELY & SHiUNN, supra note 16, § 7.23.
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power to declare the validity of an administrative rule.329 But this power
is assigned to the JCAR in virtually all the Versions. Thus, the changes in
legislative veto powers may result in a finding of undue encroachment on
judicial functions."3
When the JCAR nullifies a rule, it may do so because the rule exceeds
the scope of authority given to an administrative agency, or the rule is
contrary to legislative intent, or the JCAR does not like the rule, or because
" ' There may be other reasons too. There is no
of constituent concerns.33
recourse for individuals or groups who benefitted from a rule that is
subsequently rejected by the JCAR.332 In contrast, when an administrative
agency amends or repeals a rule, statutory procedures have to be followed and
judicial review is available. 333 By declaring rules and regulations with the
"force and effect of law" invalid, the JCAR acts as a court, whether it works
with or without defined standards.
d. Bicameralism and Presentment
The actions of the JCAR also violate the requirements of bicameralism
and presentment to the governor.334 These requirements are designed to
allow representatives of all the people to participate in the lawmaking process.
The requirement that bills be passed through both houses ensures deliberation.
The gubernatorial veto provides a check on actions of the legislature. It can
only be overriden if two-thirds of the members of the legislature believe the
bill should be law.335 With the JCAR, there is no such joint action. When
a rule is nullified, it is nullified by a group of ten. The JCAR's actions,
practically speaking, are unchecked by the general assembly and are not
subjected to the scrutiny of the governor. Not only are the representatives of
the people bypassed, but the veto power of the governor is degraded.336
Because the original bills granting nullification power to the JCAR were
passed by both houses and presented to the governor, it could be argued that
329. See State Tax Comm 'n, 641 S.W.2d at 75.
330. See Appendix A, Version IA. This is the only apparent exception because it contains
no provisions for rule- suspension.
331. In a specific instance, it may be possible to discover why action was taken by looking
at the transcript of the testimony and the statements of members. But the JCAR is not required
by statute (except perhaps in Version IIB) to explain why it acted as it did.
332. Some versions, notably IVC, say: "Any person seekingjudicial review of any such
rule shall be deemed to have exhausted all administrative review procedures." This clause does
not appear to give judicial review to a person aggrieved by JCAR action. Instead it seems to
relate to the preceding sentence which refers to rules previously promulgated by the agency and
subsequently suspended by the JCAR. This sentence is confusing and ambiguous.
333. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 536.100-.150 (1986).
334. Mo. CoNsT. art. III, §§ 21-33.
335. Id. art. III, § 32. See also Isadore Loeb, Constitutions and Constitutional Conventions
in Missouri, 1 J. Mo. CONST. CONvETION OF 1875, 27-28 (1920). The 1875 Constitution
changed the number of votes necessary to overcome a governor's veto from a majority to twothirds of the legislature. This evinces a distrust of the legislature.
336. See, e.g., Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
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therefore, the procedures are consitutionally sound. This is a facile argument
and simply does not stand up to close scrutiny. Just because the legislature
can constitutionally grant "quasi legislative" authority to an agency to make
rules under certain conditions,337 this does not mean it can reserve that same
power to itself. As the Alaska court said, "While the legislature can delegate
the power to make laws conditionally, the condition must be lawful and may
of government to function in a
not contain a grant of power to any branch
3 38
mannerprohibitedby the constitution.
When another co-equal branch of government is granted power to make
rules under certain defined conditions, and to implement a policy of the whole
legislature, several protections are in place and the doctrine of separation of
powers or checks and balances is not eroded. Power is diffused, not
concentrated. 339 The legislature shares its powers with another branch to
accomplish societal goals and to respond to complex issues that may require
the expertise and time of others besides legislators. Second, the exercise of
power is subject to judicial review to ensure that rules conform to statutes and
to legislative intent, and are not arbitrary or capricious.34 Third, rules are
made or repealed by following procedures. designed to involve all those
affected. Such procedures are not mandated by the constitution when the
legislature acts34' or by the statutes granting power to the JCAR when it
takes action.342

337. See State v. Cushman, 451 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Mo. 1970). Indeed, Missouri courts seem
to recognize that some conditional grants of authority to the executive branch may be
unconstitutional. In State ex rel. Harvey v. Wright, 158 S.W. 823, 826 (Mo. 1913), the court
declared:
In conferring this power of appointment on the Governor, the Legislature had
the power to attach such conditions to it and to require such qualifications in those
appointed by the Governor as it saw fit, so long as those conditions were not shared
by others with the Governor, or thrown upon others, wholly or in part for their
determination, and so long as the qualifications were not so drasticallyrestrictive
of the executive volition as to become for one of these three reasons in conflict with
the constitutional provisions requiring the separation and the retaining separate of the
three co-ordinate branches of government.
(emphasis added).
338. State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 777 (Alaska 1980) (emphasis added).
See also Note, UnconstitutionalConditions,73 HARv. L. REV. 1595 (1959-60).
339. See Watson, supra note 9, at 1053-57, 1067.
340. See Mo. Rv.STAT. §§ 536.100-.150 (1986); see also NEELY & SHINN, supranote
16, § 7.23.
341. The only checks on legislative power are set out in the Missouri Constitution (see
especially art III, §§ 21-33).
342. All versions appear to give the JCAR discretion to hold hearings when prior approval
is required (see III and IV). Some versions (Versions IIB and IVC) may require a hearing when
the JCAR acts to suspend a rule while others leave it discretionary (IVB).
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Granting power to a subgroup of the legislature to make343 rules that
have the force and effect of law and to repeal them violates the concept of
lawful conditions and allows the legislative branch to function in violation of
constitutional principles. First, the power given by the legislature to the JCAR
is not a diffusion but a concentration of power. Clearly the legislature cannot
delegate to a committee the power to pass a bill or to invalidate a prior
statute.3" It should not be able to delegate to a legislative committee the
power to create or undo rules that have the force of law. To do this would
encourage broader and broader grants of rulemaking power to agencies. The
legislature, through the JCAR, would exercise more control over executive
discretion. The legislature would be able to fill in details in legislation at a
later time, under unchecked conditions, instead of specifying these details in
the original legislation which would be subject to a gubernatorial veto.
Second, as a result of this delegation of power to the JCAR, there is no
effective judicial review and, third, there are no procedural protections or
methods to ensure public participation.345
Professor Frickey asserted in his analysis of the Minnesota legislative
review committee that "when stripped of its veneer, any argument for
sustaining a state legislative committee's authority to suspend administrative
rules probably must be based on the premise that a strict approach3 46to
separation of powers is fundamentally at odds with good public policy."
An examination of other public policies that favor or disfavor a legislative
veto is therefore necessary before any final conclusions can be made about the
powers of the JCAR.
B. Policy Arguments For and Against the Legislative Veto
Policy considerations affecting the legislative veto have been hotly
debated for years. 347 No one seriously disputes the fact that the legislature
is the proper lawmaking body. Moreover, the framers of the United States
Constitution and most state constitutions did not foresee the growth of
administrative agencies and the bureaucratic state.348 Most observers agree
that oversight of administrative agencies should be shared by the legislature

343. The JCAR "makes" rules in the sense that it tells agencies what versions of a rule it
will or will not accept. If the agency doesn't conform to the committee wishes, the rule may not
become effective. See supra notes 71-72.
344. Mo. CoNsT. art. III,
§§ 21-33.
345. See, e.g., Appendix A, Version IVC.
346. Frickey, supranote 59, at 1254.
347. Levinson, supra note 9, at 96. See generally articles cited supra note 9; see also
BoNFIELD, supranote 18, § 8.3.2.(d), (f); DAvis, supranote 10, §§ 2,6; SCHWARTZ, supranote
18, § 4.19.
348. See State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 781 (Alaska 1990) (Boochever, J.,
dissenting); JCAR REPORT, supra note 63, at 1; sources cited supra note 347.
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and the executive, with assistance from the judiciary. 49 How that control
is exercised, though, provokes disagreement.
1. Arguments for the Veto
Some of the policies favoring the legislative veto have already been
discussed above.35 However, it is useful to summarize the policies and
examine their status in Missouri.35' The legislative veto:
1. promotes governmental efficiency by not bogging the legislature down
in the bill-passage process;
2. assures greater political accountability of the bureaucracy. Elected
representatives exercise a check on unelected, overzealous bureaucrats;
3. provides for mediation and compromise between the regulated and
regulators;
4. guards against rules being passed that are inconsistent with legislative
intent or statutory authorization;
5. provides a faster and more efficient review of rules than the more
cumbersome judicial review procedures;
6. ensures greater coordination of policy and rulemaking since all rules are
reviewed by the same body; and
7. forces administrators to work in close contact with the legislature to
ensure that difficult issues of policy are resolved.
a. Efficiency
One cannot deny that the JCAR protects the legislative process from
dealing with most issues of rulemaking. The General Assembly does not have
to take any action unless it wishes to overturn its own committee. It is
undoubtedly a faster process than the bill-passage process. However, there
may also be inefficiencies for government generally. The JCAR may slow
down the rulemaking process and may duplicate hearings held by agencies.
In that sense, it is not efficient and duplicates other governmental functions
even though the General Assembly itself may save time.35 2 But efficiency
is not a hallmark of democracy.353 A government with separate powers,
checks and balances and constitutionally mandated procedures 5 . that ensure
slow deliberative decisionmaking, is not always, or even usually, efficient.
Too much efficiency may lead to undemocratic results, concentration of power
and tyranny.

349. See sources cited supranote 347; see also Martinez v. Department of Indus. Labor &
Human Relations, 478 N.W.2d 582, 585 (,Vis. 1992).
350. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27, 212, 313-14, 320-22.
351. This list borrows heavily from BONFIELD, supra note 18, §§ 8.1, 8.3. See generally
Restoring the Balance, supra note 20.
352. See, e.g., Appendix A, Version IVB.

353. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944, 959.
354. Mo. CoNsT. art. III, §§ 21-33.
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b. PoliticalAccountability
While the promise of political accountability is held forth, in reality it is
not achieved. The JCAR consists of ten members of the legislature who do
not represent the state as a whole, but only their own individual constituencies.
Administrators are responsive, not to the entire elected body, but only to some
members of it. Far more political accountability already exists for most
agencies because they must report to the governor, who is accountable to the
people. The current system mocks the concept of political accountability.
Moreover, the assertion, propounded nationally.. and in Missouri," 6 that
the legislative veto protects citizens from an overzealous bureaucracy is
overstated and inaccurate. To the extent that there is tighter control and
supervision by the governor over agencies, and there is effective judicial
remedies against agency abuse as well as initial legislative control by "tightly
written enabling statutes," the risk of abuse by agencies is lowered.3" 7
c. Mediation
It is probably accurate that the JCAR provides a mediative role and
makes administrators more responsive to the regulated constituency.5 8
However, that goal can be accomplished through the original legislation
creating the JCAR and giving it "review and recommend authority.
That
authority is probably sufficient since state agencies are likely respond to the
legislature because it has the power of the purse.3" Those who serve on the
" ' The JCAR
JCAR also tend to be leaders in the appropriations process.36
has the authority to hold hearings and has done so: It has encouraged
executive representatives and regulated constituencies tor appear before the
committee to work out difference over rules. This procedure is useful and
ought to be used when the legislature believes that constituents are not being
heard. The JCAR can mediate in this way without exercising veto powers that
violate the constitution.362

355. See, e.g., Restoring the Balance, supra note 20.

356. JCAR REPORT, supra note 63, at 1.
357. Levinson, supra note 19, at 131 n.92.
358. JCARREPORT, supranote 63, at 3 ("Compromises were usually worked out, either by
pressure or persuasion.").
359. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.037 (1986).

360. JCAR REPORT, supra note 63, at 5.
361. Interview with Mary Estes, supra note 61. She notes that this has not been the case
in recent years.
362. See, e.g., Rhyme, supra note 8, at 5-22 (listing a variety of methods used in other
states); see also Levinson, supranote 19, at 96-112.
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d. Determination of Legislative Intent and Statutory Authorization
The JCAR is allowed to decide, as are the courts, whether rules exceed
statutory authority or legislative intent. 63 It is also allowed to decide, as no
other branch can, whether rules are unwise or should not exist for any
reason."
The JCAR can probably effect this task more quickly and
inexpensively than the courts. However, the JCAR may not be able to make
decisions as dispassionately or as accurately as the judiciary.36 The cost of
such encroachment on the functions of the judiciary is an unacceptable and
unnecessary disruption in the balance of power. Moreover, implementing a
legislative veto without going through the full bill-enacting process allows the
JCAR to change lawful rules and possibly to change the originallegislation
and violate the original legislative intent.3" One author has argued that a
legislative committee's use of the legislative veto may result in "a significant
skewing of the originallegislativeintent toward the interests of [the Congressmen] on the overseeing committee or subcommittee and the groups and people
most responsible for their re-election."367

e. CentralizedReview
The JCAR also holds out the structural promise of being the single body
to review all administrative rules and to ensure coordination of policies
between agencies. In fact, the JCAR has not operated in that fashion. It tends
to respond primarily to the complaints of constituents or of regulated
groups.36 It can review administrative rules and coordinate policies only
if it has a larger staff and has more formalized and regular proceedings. It
can also exercise its oversight role under the original legislation 6 without
exercising rule-nullification powers.

f

Closer Legislative Contact

Legislative veto provisions do encourage closer contact between some
legislators and administrators. It is certainly possible that administrators gain
a better perspective on policy-implementation strategies and that they can
resolve complex issues more in accord with legislative intent.370 These are
important goals, but they are goals which can be achieved within the existing
constitutional framework and under the original legislation creating the JCAR.

363. See Appendix A, Version I.
364. See Appendix A, Versions IVB, C.
365. See also supra notes 322, 325.
366. Frickey, supra note 59, at 1262-63.
367. Brubaker, supra note 9, at 92. See also Auerbach, supra note 325.
368. Interview with Mary Estes, supra note 61. She indicates that hearings are held only
when concerns or complaints arise, regardless of the source.
369. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.037(2) (1986) ('The committee shall review all rules
promulgated by any agency") (emphasis added).
370. See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 9, at 1409-13.
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More time may be consumed, but the constitutions were not designed with
efficiency in mind.3 7' The fact that legislative control of the bureaucracy
is desirable is simply not enough to justify a departure from existing methods
that are constitutionally permissible.372
2. Arguments Against the Veto
Moreover, there are significant additional policy reasons that support
rejection of a legislative veto, particularly where the power is concentrated in
a committee of the general assembly. These reasons include: 3" (1)
Participation in the agency rulemaking process by regulated groups may
decreasebecause those regulated may feel their efforts should concentrate on
the legislative body; (2) Agencies may become confused because they are not
given guidance from the legislative committee and the result may be that no
policy is formed; (3) Over time the legislature would tend to give overbroad
delegations of power to an agency because of reliance on the legislative veto
to reject rules believed undesirable (with the net effect that less and less
guidance would be given to agencies); (4) There would be some effect on
judicial review of agency rules because a presumption of validity would be
created where the legislature had failed to reject a challenged rule; (5) Rules
might be based on information provided by or contacts with legislators, rather
than on information from the usual notice and comment process; (6) The small
number of legislators on the committee may be able to subvert the will of the
whole legislature by rejecting lawful rules; (7) The legislature as a whole may
give less oversight to agency rulemaking by depending too much on the
review committee; (8) Stalemates may develop between legislatures and
agencies; (9) Agencies would be forced to consider ad hoc adjudication rather
than rulemaking to escape legislative review of their actions. Virtually all
scholars believe that rulemaking is preferable to adjudication as it is more
likely to provide guidance to affected parties.374
These policy arguments have usually been addressed more by scholars
than by the courts, but they are factors that should be weighed in the overall
process of deciding whether the reasons for the legislative veto outweigh even
liberal constitutional interpretation.375 Moreover, some scholars have argued
that administrative agencies "[m]ay be the only institutions capable of
fulfilling the civic republican ideal of deliberative decisionmaking. 376

371. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944.
372. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 59, at 1254.
373. This list borrows heavily from BONFIELD, supra note 18, §§ 8.1 & 8.3. See also Bruff
& Gellhom, supra note 9, at 1378-81.
374. DAVIS, supranote 10, at § 6.1.
375. See Frickey, supra note 59, at 1254.
376. Mark Seidenfield, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the BureaucraticState, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1541 (1992). He notes that administrators "fall between the extremes of
the politically over-responsive Congress and the over-insulated courts." Id. at 1542. See also
Jerry L. Mashaw, Pro Delegation: Why AdministratorsShould Make PoliticalDecisions, I J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 99 (1985).
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Perhaps agencies are in a better position to make reasoned decisions about
implementation than legislatures.
There is, however, another consideration explored below, that makes
Missouri somewhat unique among the states, and provides an additional reason
to find the legislative veto-in whatever version it exists-unconstitutional.
C. Voter Rejection of ConstitutionalAmendments Allowing
Legislative Veto
In his excellent review of the various state models for legislative vetoes,
Professor Levinson posed the following hypothetical:
Assume that after the electorate of a state has rejected a proposed constitutional amendment that [would have] authorized a one-house or a two-house
veto, the legislature enacts a statute creating the very type of system that
would have been rejected in the referendum. Assume further that the state
has no judicial precedent on point. In litigation challenging the statute,
should the state courts hold it unconstitutional
77 on the grounds that it is
contrary to the outcome of the referendum?
He suggests that because courts are bound by an amendment adopted by
the people, equal deference should be given to a vote which rejects a proposed
constitutional amendment. 7 He notes three objections which might be
raised to the use of public opinion to interpret the constitution and he
concludes that the only relevant objection is that ascertaining public opinion
is difficult.379 Where a vote is negative, it may be difficult to determine
why the constitutional amendment was defeated. Possibly, people may have
believed that the constitutional amendment was unnecessary because the
legislature already had the power involved in the amendment, or people may
have wanted to retain flexibility in the constitution."' Even if the court
doesn't consider itself bound by the results, the vote would seem to be a
persuasive factor to be considered because it reflects a "significant statement
of public policy."38' At the time of Levinson's writing, Missouri and three
other states had rejected constitutional amendments allowing the legislative
veto. 8 In his view, these referenda have "strong persuasive effect."

377. Levinson, supranote 19, at 116. See also J.E. Macy, Annotation,PowerofLegislative
Body To Amend, Repeal, orAbrogate Initiative or Referendum Measure, or to Enact Measure
Defeated on Referendum, 33 A.L.R. 2D 1118 (1954).
378. Levinson, supra note 19, at 116.
379. Id. at 116-17. The other objections are (1) that the majority may be affecting the rights
of a minority, and (2) that the voters may be reflecting their own self-interest rather than their
philosophy of government. Id. He asserts that neither of these are usually present when a
legislative veto is involved. Id.
380. Id. at 118.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 90 (Alaska, Florida, Texas).
383. Id. at 118.
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Missourians have twice rejected proposals for legislative vetoes.384

384. The 1976 amendment provided as follows:
Section 1. Section 8, article IV, constitution of Missouri, is repealed and one
new section adopted in lieu therof, to be known as section 8, to read as follows:
Section 8. Administrative rules and regulations other than those which affect
only the internal operation of the agency adopting them and other than those
promulgated under authority granted by the constitution may be rescinded by
concurrent resolution of both houses which shall be effective immediately upon the
adoption of such resolution without presentation to the governor. Every other
resolution to which the concurrence of the senate and house of representatives may
be necessary, except on questions of adjournment, going into joint session, and of
amending this constitution, shall be presented to the governor, and before the same
shall take effect, shall be proceeded upon in the same manner as in the case of a bill;
provided, that no resolution shall have the effect to repeal, extend, or amend any law
except as otherwise authorized under the provisions of this section.
The 1982 amendment provided as follows:
Section 1. Article IV, Constitution of Missouri, is amended by adding the
following sections, to read as follows:
Section 54. The general assembly may, by a separate resolution of either
house, concurred in by the other, invalidate any state agency regulation. Such
resolutions shall not be submitted to the governor. Any regulation invalidated by
the general assembly shall ten days thereafter have no force or effect, nor shall any
regulation having the same general effect be thereafter promulgated unless legislative
authority to promulgate such rules is delegated by future statutes. When the general
assembly invalidates a state agency regulation, it shall immediately file a notice of
such action with the state agency which promulgated the regulation and with, the
office of the secretary of state.
Section 55. As used in this article, the term "state agency" shall include every
state office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, and commission, whether
created by constitution, statute, or initiative, but shall not include the courts, any
agency in the judicial or legislative branch of state government, the Missouri national
guard, the state bar, the University of Missouri system, and the Missouri state
university and college systems.
As used in this article, the term "regulation" includes every rule, regulation,
order, or standard of general application or the amendment, supplement, or revision
of any such rule, regulation, order, or standard adopted by any state agency to
implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to
govern its procedure, except one which relates only to the internal management of
the state agency. "Regulation" does not mean or include any form prescribed by a
state agency or any instructions relating to the use of the form, but this provision is
not a limitation upon any requirement that a regualtion be adopted pursuant to
applicable law when one is needed to implement the law under which the form is
issued.
Section 56. No member of the public shall be denied a legal right or privilege
by any state agency order, opinion, statement of policy, or staff manual or
instruction unless the same was duly promulgated as a regulation in accordance with
applicable law. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to require a state
agency to promulgate regulations in order to implement a decision reached as a
result of an administrative adjudicatory proceeding.
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While it may not be possible to know why the voters rejected each amendment, we do know what they were told by the press.
In 1976, both major papers in St. Louis, the now defunct St. Louis GlobeDemocrat(generally considered a conservative newspaper) and the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch (generally considered more liberal) urged rejection of the
proposed amendment. The Post declared that "the legislature already
possesse[d] an adequate check on the rulemaking power," referring to the bill
passage process.38 The Globe used even stronger language, declaring that
the proposed amendment was "a transparent power grab by state legislators
seeking to undermine legitimate powers of the executive branch."386 The
Globe noted that the bill would bypass the governor because it allowed a twohouse concurrent resolution without presentment to the chief executive.387
The editorial asserted that administrative agencies "would be easy prey for
meddlesome legislators who wanted to rewrite rules and regulations to please
'
Therefore, the people, at least in some areas of
some interested party."388
the state, were exposed to political philosophy and the constitutional issues of
separation of power.
After the defeat of the 1976 constitutional amendment, the legislature
assigned greater powers to the JCAR in some bills.389 In 1978, then
Governor Joseph P. Teasdale vetoed a measure that would have given the
JCAR power to rescind rules without further legislative action.9 However,

The power of a court to invalidate a regulation shall not be altered or barred
by a refusal of the general assembly to invalidate that regulation.
The procedure adopted by this article allowing the general assembly to
invalidate regulations shall not be considered an exhaustible administrative remedy.
Section 58. The provisions of section 54, 55, 56, and the second paragraph
of section 57 of this article shall apply to regulations in effect at the time this article
become effective.
The popular vote in 1976 was 318,567 for, 690,114 against. The vote in 1982 was 497,341 for,
792,329 against.
385. Poor Amendment, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 11, 1976, at F2.
386. Reject State Power Grab, ST. Louis GLOBE-DEMOCRAT, July 29, 1976, at 16A.

387. Id.
388. Id. This fear of the legislature has been a continuing theme in Missouri politics. For
example, there were attempts in the 1875 constitutional convention to change the rule of
interpretation of the powers of the general assembly from one of limitation to only those granted
to it. See Loeb, supra note 335, at 28. Professor Loeb notes that the history of most
amendments to the Missouri constitution reveals a tendency to limit the power of the legislature.
Id. at 27-37.
389. See Appendix A, Version I.
390. The 79th GeneralAssembly passed HCSHBNo. 939 and No. 1350 which were vetoed.,
In his veto message of April 4,'1978, the governor outlined a detailed list of objections to the
bill. The bill would: (1) place excessive power in the JCAR; (2) provide no standards for JCAR
rule-suspension; (3) engender potential conflict because the JCARcould thwart legislativeintent;
(4) delay or deny essential information to the public; (5) duplicate hearings held under chapter
536 and (6) give the committee rulemaking authority in violation of article IV § 16. Further,
the governor argued that (7) adequate safeguards already existed to protect the public and that
(8) other bills giving judicial review to the AHC were more appropriate. He concluded by
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the legislature, thwarted in its attempts to grant power directly to the JCAR
as a part of its enabling legislation, began assigning powers to the JCAR by
incorporating these powers in other legislation. 9 These actions by the
General Assembly reflected the rising national interest of many state
legislatures in the legislative veto.3"
In 1982, the legislature once again proposed another constitutional
amendment.393 This amendment also provided for veto by a concurrent
resolution passed by both houses, but not for presentment to the governor. 94
It did exempt certain agencies from rule review, including the courts, the state
university system, the national guard and the Missouri Bar.395 These
exemptions were apparently inserted to make the proposal more palatable to
certain groups that had previously opposed it. An organization that supported
the proposal, People Against Rules and Regulations Without Representation
(PARR), declared that the amendment would make state government more
responsive and that no one, including the governor, had control over some
agencies.3 96 Then Governor Christopher "Kit" Bond, various agency heads,
and a few citizen commission members countered with arguments that the
legislature had the power to overturn any rule or regulation by using the
lawmaking process, and that the amendment would "upset the fundamental
separation and balance of power which had existed in Missouri since [its]
admission to the Union."'397 Editorials called for rejection of the amendment.3 98 The Missouri Conservation Commission, several wildlife groups,
and Common Cause in Missouri filed suit opposing the amendment."'
Thus, for both amendments, some voters were at least apprised of
arguments relating to constitutional separation of powers issues and excessive
legislative involvement in the executive function of rulemaking. The votes
were decisively negative.4" Moreover, the vote indicates more than just
general "anti-anything" attitudes of the populace, because several other
amendments on the ballot passed each time.4°0

saying that "separation of powers ...must be respected." HOUSE J., GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
1978, Vol. II, 1523-25 (1978). It is interesting to note that the last procedure noted [(8) above]
has been declared unconstitutional. See State Tax Comm'n v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n,
641 S.W.2d 69, 75 (Mo. 1982).
391. See Appendix A, Version II.
392. See, e.g., Restoring the Balance, supra note 20; Falk, supra note 20, at 292.
393. See supranote 384.
394. See supra note 384.
395. See supra note 384.
396. Robert Goodrich, Amendment 2: Legislators vs. Bureaucrats, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1982, at 15A.
397. Id.
398. See, e.g., And 13 MissouriBallot Issues, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 1982, at
14A; And No On Amendment 2, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 12, 1982, at 8A.
399. Terry Ganey, Amendment 2 Called Threat to State Agencies, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1982, § 1, at 42.
400. See supra note 384.
401. In 1976 four of seven amendments passed. In 1982 eight of thirteen amendments
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No Missouri case specifically addresses the weight to be accorded to a
negative vote by the people on a constitutional amendment. There are cases
that suggest that the legislature has the power to repeal a law adopted by
voters in an initiative proceeding.0 2 But these cases simply recognize that
the people and the general assembly appear to be constitutional equals in the
law-making process.40 3 They do not provide support for the view that the
legislature can amend the constitution without a vote of the people.4°4
Missouri courts have attached importance to the intent of voters when
interpreting the constitution and amendments to it.405 In Barnes v.
Bailey,"6 the court declared that "[t]he fundamental rule of constitutional
construction is that courts must give effect to the intent of the people in
adopting the amendment."4 7 The intent is primarily gleaned from the plain
meaning of the words in the statute and "[s]tatements and representations
made before a vote on a proposition are not conclusive upon the courts."4 8
However, the courts will not construe the "constitutional provision in such a
way as to thwart the voters' purpose."4" These cases suggest intent is
important and should be accorded some weight.
Therefore, intent should be equally important when the voters reject an
amendment. First, by examining the plain meaning of the words in the
rejected amendments, it is clear the voters did not want the general assembly,
acting as a whole through the mechanism of a concurrent resolution not
presented to the governor, to reject administrative rules. The constitutional
invalidity of JCAR powers becomes more compelling if one accepts the
premise that because the voters did not intend for the whole legislature to
exercise a veto by concurrent resolution, they certainly did not intend for a
committee of the legislature to exercise the veto. Second, significant weight
should be given to voter-intent when the general assembly, shortly after voters
have rejected its proposed constitutional amendment, acts to implement a
statutory scheme that achieves a result that has been rejected by its constituents. The general assembly, by presenting both amendments to the people for
a vote seemed to recognize that it was necessary to receive voter approval
before it could use a two-house concurrent resolution veto system. Twice the

passed.
402. See City of St. Louis v. Cavanaugh, 207 S.W.2d 449, 454 (Mo. 1948) (same as
between a city and its citizens); State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 130 S.W. 689, 694 (Mo.

1910).
403. Halliburton,130 S.W. at 694.
404. Indeed the constitution provides the only methods of amendment. Mo. CONST. art. III,
§§ 49-50, art. XII, §§ 1-3. See also Halliburton,130 S.W. at 694.
405. See, e.g., Tichenor v. Missouri State Lottery Comm'n, 742 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Mo.
1988); Household Fin. Corp. v. Shaffner, 203 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Mo. 1947).
406. 706 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1986).
407. Id. at 28.
408. Missourians ForHonest Elections v. MissouriElections Comm'n, 536 S.W.2d766, 775
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
409. Tichenor, 742 S.W.2d at 173.
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voters rejected those proposals. ° The fact that amendments were submitted
to the people demonstrates some recognition by the general assembly that
absent constitutional change it had no power to reject agency rules and
regulations except through the bill enactment process. " As Professor
Levinson noted, "In rejecting the proposed constitutional amendments, the
people of these states express their disagreement with the
412 respective legislatures that had recommended adopting the amendments.
Levinson also suggests that passage of time is a significant factor to
consider in the weight to be given to voter action. 3 The more distant in
time the vote, the less weight to be accorded to it. The time factor is
unimportant in Missouri, as both rejections are recent. Moreover, any
importance to be attached to the time factor should be outweighed by the
legislative disregard for public sentiment. Missouri courts should recognize
that the people have spoken decisively, not once, but twice, on the legislative
veto.
Apparently unwilling to accept a vote of the people denying the veto
power, and perhaps with a careful eye on the Chadha decision, the general
assembly, at the behest of the JCAR, 41 4 "mutated" the "virus" again. A
requirement that rules receive prior approval 4 5 was coupled with the
removal of any standards for JCAR approval or rejection of rules; and a nonseverability "poison pill" provision was added."" The latter change raised
the stakes for contesting the powers of the JCAR. For even if the court
should find the grants of power to the JCAR unconstitutional, it faces a
formidable problem with the non-severability clause.
D. Overcoming the Problem of Non-severability
Two variations of the non-severability clause have been used. The first
variation states that
the provisions of this [act, section, chapter] are nonseverable and the grant
of rulemaking authority is essentially dependent on the review power vested
with the joint committee on administrative rules. If the review power is
held unconstitutional or invalid, the grant of rulemaking shall also be
invalid or void.417

The second variation is even more insidious for it provides that

410. See supranote 384.
411. See infra note 446.
412. Levinson, supra note 19, at 90.
413. Id. at 118.
414. JCAR REPoRT, supra note 63, app. I at 5 (the JCAR met on October 31, 1983, less
than a year after voter rejection, to propose new wording to be added to legislation).
415. See Appendix A, Version IVB.
416. Appendix A, Version IVB.
417. Appendix A, Version IVB.
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notwithstandingthe provisons ofsection 1. 140, RSMo, the provisions of this
[act, section, chapter] are non-severable and the grant of rulemaking
authority is essentially dependent on the review power vested with the
committee. If the review power is held unconstitutional or invalid, the
grant of rulemaking authority and any rule promulgated under any such
rulemaking authority shall also be invalid or void.41'
The second provision differs from the first only where the language has been
italicized. A successful challenge to JCAR power could possibly mean that
literally dozens of rules would be in jeopardy if the non-severability clause
were upheld.
Professor Frickey notes that, at the federal level, the problem has been
to determine whether the legislative veto provisions in a statute can be severed
in such a way that the remaining portions of the statutes could be upheld.419
Federal courts have had to determine, first, whether the portion of the statute
that remains can stand by itself absent the veto, and second, whether Congress
would have enacted the legislation without the legislative veto provisions.420
A very different situation exists in Missouri. Statutes specifically provide for
a general presumption of severability. 2 However, the more recent variation
of the non-severability clause specifically refers to the general statutory
presumption and indicates that it is to be ignored.4z
In a series of cases, the court has provided that the test for severability
requires the following inquiry: When the invalid portions of a statute are
excised, are the remaining provisions capable of constitutional enforcement
and would the legislature have effected the statute in the same way had it
known that the excised part would be held invalid?4" Accordingly, if the
court declared the legislative veto powers of the JCAR invalid, and upheld the
non-severability clause, then the Court would have to analyze each statute's
particular grant of rulemaking power to an agency to determine how far the

418. Appendix A, Version IVC (emphasis added).
419. Frickey, supra note 59, at 1261.
420. Id.
421. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.140 (1986) states:
The provisions of every statute are severable. If any provision of a statute is found
by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions
of the statute are valid unless the court finds the valid provisions of the statute are
so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void
provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid
provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds that the valid provisions
standing alone are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance

with the legislative intent.
422. See Appendix A, Version IVC ("notwithstanding the provisions of 1.140 Mo. REv.
STAT. the provisions of [this act, section, chapter] are nonseverable ... 2).
423. See State ex rel. Bunker Resource Recycling & Reclamation, Inc. v. Mehan, 782

S.W.2d 381, 389 (Mo. 1990) (en bane); Labor's Educ. & Political Club-Indep. v. Danforth, 561
S.W. 2d 339, 350 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); State ex rel. Enright v. Connett, 475 S.W.2d 78, 81
(Mo. 1972) (en bane); State ex rel. Audrain County v. Hackmann, 205 S.W. 12, 14 (Mo. 1918)
(en bane); State ex rel. Harvey v. Wright, 158 S.W. 823, 826 (Mo. 1913).
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remainder of the statute could be enforced. However, some statutes seem to
indicate that not just the rulemaking power, but all the substantive provisions
Such a
of the act, are tied to the validity of the non-severability clause.'
statute by statute analysis is ultimately unsatisfactory. First, the nonseverability clause should not be enforced due to constitutional and statutory
infirmities. 4 Second, its enforcement creates uncertainty as to the validity
of prior rules under Version IVB,426 and could have dire consequences if all
rules were voided under Version IVC,427 and could be even more destructive
if entire acts had to be voided.
The court should not uphold the non-severability clauses in either form.
First,the court should adopt the reasoning of the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Brown. There, the court declared that "the adoption and use of administrative
regulations are important tools in the operation of modem government at all
levels. The purpose is to enable a governor to successfully carry out the
constitutionally-mandated executive and administrative duties bestowed upon
that office."428
In Kentucky, the executive is charged by the constitution to see that the
"laws be faithfully executed."429 The Brown court noted that the nonseverability clause
not only impliedly reorganizes the executive duties of the Governor, but
also attempts to usurp these powers. Having failed at the first part, it
further attempts to restrict the ability of the Governor to carry out his sworn
duties ....

The restriction placed on the executive by [the statute]

effectively and unconstitutionally
limits and interferes with the governor's
4 30

mandated duties.

If the Missouri court determines that the legislative veto power of the
JCAR is unconstitutional, it could easily sever that grant of power from the
remainder of the statute. All of the statutes containing grants of power to the
JCAR are capable of standing alone because the excised non-severability
clause would not affect the substance or the operation of the act in any way.
The remaining valid provisions are not "incomplete and ... incapable of
being executed in accordance with the legislative intent."43'
However, there are additional reasons to excise the non-severability
clause. Part of a court's determination focuses on whether the general
assembly would have passed the remaining portion of the statute had it

424. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 444.380(2) (Supp. 1991).
425. See infra text accompanying notes 428-31.
426. But see Gary v. United States, 499 A.2d 815, 830-33 (D.C. 1985) (the court allowed
congressional actions taken before the veto was found unconstitutional to stand).
427. See infra text accompanying notes 447-50.
428, Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 919 (Ky. 1984).
429. Id. The Missouri provision is Mo CoNsT. art IV, § 2. ('The governor shall take care
that the laws are distributed and faithfully executed . ..
430. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 920.
431. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.140 (1986).
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"known that the excised portions [would be held] invalid."4 32 To contend
that the general assembly did not intend its grant of rulemaking authority to
be conditioned on the power of the JCAR to review those rules would
contradict the meaning of the words in the statute, although there is some
indication that the veto provisions are now "boilerplate" additions to virtually
every bill granting rulemaking authority.433 But the court should not be
inexorably bound by that intent when it is unconstitutional. The legislature
has the power to grant or not to grant rulemaking authority to the executive
branch, but it should not be allowed to condition that grant on an unconstitutional condition.434 The legislature should not be permitted to do indirectly
what it may not do directly.435 If the court finds the grant of veto power to
the JCAR unconstitutional, then it should also find the non-severability clause
unconstitutional, because this clause is a condition based on an unconstitutional grant of power. Moreover, declaring the non-severability clause unconstitutional frustrates only the legislature's subsidiary policy of controlling the
executive--constitutionally improper policy.436
There are other, more technical, arguments that might be made to
overcome the non-severability clause. There are ambiguities in the nonseverability language. One sentence says that the grant of rulemaking
authority is essentially dependent on the review power, but the second
sentence declares that if the review power is "held unconstitutional or invalid"
'
the rulemaking authority "shall also be invalid or void."437
There is some
conflict between those two sentences. Missouri courts, in interpreting
statutory language where "substantially" is used, have said that word is
synonymous with "practically," "nearly," "almost," "essentially"and "virtually. 438 Thus by "essentially" the general assembly may have meant that the
rulemaking power is "substantially" but not totally or completely dependent on
JCAR review. In fact, the legislature has in one instance adopted language
where the word "essentially" has been replaced by the word "totally,"
declaring that "the grant of rulemaking authority is totally dependent on the
power vested with the [JCAR]. 439 The use of essentially creates an

432. Millsap v. Quinn, 785 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo. 1990) (en bane); State ex rel. Audrain Co.
v. Hackmann, 205 S.W. 12, 14 (Mo. 1918) (en banc).
433. See, e.g., Appendix A, Version IVC (disclaiming the presumption ofseverability); see
JCAR REPORT, supra note 63, at 5 (concerning use of "boilerplate" language).
434. See State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769,777 (Alaska 1980); Synder & Ireland,
supra note 73, at 225 n.310; Note, UnconstitutionalConditions,73 HARV. L. REv. 1595 (195960); see also supra note 337.
435. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958
(1983).
436. See, e.g., Note, Severability of Legislative Provisions: A PolicyAnalysis, 97 HARv.
L. REV. 1182, 1196 (1984).
437. See Appendix A, Versions IVB, IVC.
438. St. Louis-Southwestern Ry. v. Cooper, 496 S.W.2d 836, 842 (Mo. 1973); Continental
Tel. Co. v. Bouse, 580 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
439. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 444.380 (Supp. 1991) (enacted in 1989) (emphasis added). See also
Appendix A, Version VC.
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opportunity for the court to find that reasons may exist for not enforcing the
clause-such as the unconstitutionality of the veto powers. However, the use
of the word "shall" in the next sentence removes most doubts raised by the
word "essentially."" 0 The cases clearly indicate that "shall" is mandatory
and not directory." Nonetheless, an ambiguity is created that requires the
court to look closely at the language to determine the intent of the legislature.,4
Another more blatant ambiguity is created by the words "dependent on
the review power vested with the [JCAR]" 443 While it may be logical to
assume that the words "review power" relate to the powers (i.e., prior
approval, suspension) granted to the JCAR in the sentences immediately
preceding, the word "review" is never used in those prior sentences. The only
place where "review" is used in the statutes with reference to the JCAR is in
§ 536.037, the original grant of "review" authority to the JCAR.444
Therefore, that clause is susceptible to the interpretation that if the veto
powers of the JCAR are unconstitutional and excised from the statute, but the
non-severability clause is held valid, the rulemaking authority granted to the
agency also remains valid since the "review power" makes reference to
§ 536.037 and not the veto powers set out in the specific statute. This
interpretation would allow the court to uphold the non-severability clause but
blunt its devastating effect. The interpretation is not so strained as it might
seem. First, it allows the court to adhere to doctrines of statutory interpretation that favor a finding of constitutionality when the legislature acts.445
Second, it interprets the intent of the legislature in a manner that makes it
constitutional. Third, this interpretation gives effect to the plain words of the
statute, in light of its ambiguous and conflicting wording. Finally, it avoids
the skepticism engendered by the fact that a reasonable legislature could
hardly view the constitutionally dubious legislative veto and non-severability
clause provisions
as the sine qua non of the act, or the grant of rulemaking
6
power.

440. See Appendix A, Version IVB, C.
441. See, e.g., State ex rel.Dreerv. Public Sch. Retirement Sys., 519 S.W.2Jr290, 296 (Mo.
1975); State ex reL Hopkins v. Stemmons, 302 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
442. See, e.g., Kieffer v. Kieffer, 590 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) ("it is proper
to consider the 'words' used in their plain and ordinary meaning in an effort to ascertain the true
intent of the General Assembly.").
443. Appendix A, Versions IVB, IVC (emphasis added).
444. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.037(3), (4) (1986).
445. Danforth ex reL Farmer's Elec. Coop., Inc. v. State Envfl. Improvement Auth., 518
S.W.2d 68, 72 (Mo. 1975) (en banc) ("An act of the legislature is presumed to be valid and will
notbe declared unconstitutional unless it clearly and undoubtedly contravenes some constitutional
provision.").
446. Voters have rejected two proposed constitutional amendments by the general assembly.
The governor has also vetoed at least one bill granting powers directly to the JCAR. Moreover,
the general assembly is aware of the constitutional problems, and of court decisions both at the
national level and in several states, virtually all uniformly against the veto. Further, the general
assembly's own JCAR Report in 1986 recommended that the general assembly give "serious
consideration to one or more of the following:" (1) constitutional amendment; (2) veto by statute,
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There are very real practical problems if the non-severability clause is not
invalidated or blunted. The following scenario is likely to unfold. First,
dozens of agencies suddenly without rulemaking power would lobby for that
power and the legislature could find it necessary to review each piece of
legislation to redetermine if rulemaking power really was intended for that
agency. This would be a time-consuming and onerous task. In some cases,
failure of the current legislature to act might gut an agency's ability to handle
a problem assigned to it by a former legislature, one that might have intended
rulemaking power. Second, while the problem would be minimized in those
instances where rulemaking authority was granted, but where the agency
believed no rules were necessary for implementation, other agencies issui 44
rules under some versions could face sudden invalidation of their rules. §
The prospect of rules becoming instantly void would wreak havoc on the
bureaucratic regulatory system. Individuals, groups, and businesses are likely
to have expended substantial time and money to implement or comply with
those rules. In other situations, where rules are mandated by federal law for
various aid programs, there would be the potential loss of millions of dollars.
In some cases, not just rulemaking but entire pieces of legislation would be
at risk." While arguments of equitable estoppel449 and fundamental fair
play might not carry the day, they are considerations that should not be
overlooked. At a minimum, if the court believes it is bound to uphold the
rules
non-severability clause, it should fashion its remedy to allow all4existing
0
to stand and allow its ruling to be effected only prospectively.
V. CONCLUSION
Missouri is unique and stands alone among the states in so far as it grants
breathtaking powers to the JCAR. These powers are more extensive than
those allowed legislative committees and even entire legislatures in other
jurisdictions.45' JCAR power has broadened from simple "review and
recommend" authority to standardless, unchecked control over most existing
and proposed administrative rules. The various "mutations" of this constitutional "virus" have so infected the statutes and strained the constitutional
balance of power that they must be judicially eradicated. With the Mead
exception, every jurisdiction called upon to determine the constitutionality of
the legislative veto has found it to be a violation of (1) the bicameralism and
presentment clauses of the respective constitutions; (2) the separation of

and (3) an executive rule-making agency to oversee all rule making. JCAR REPORT, supra note
63, at 6.
447. See Appendix A, Version IVC.

448. See supra note 447.
449. See generallyKenneth D. Dean, Equitable Estoppel Against the Government: The
Missouri Experience-Time to Rethink the Concept, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 63 (1992).
450. See, e.g., Gary v. United States, 499 A.2d 815, 832 (D.C. 1985); Commonwealth v.
Kuphal, 500 A.2d 1205, 1219-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
451. Connecticut is a rare exception, but its committee is constitutionallyauthorized. See
supra note 178; see also Levinson, supra note 19, at 86-105, 122; Rhyme, supra note 8, at 6.
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powers doctrine (because the legislative veto unduly encroaches on the powers
of the executive, the judiciary, or both, regardless of whether the separation
of powers doctrine is explicitly or implicitly stated in the constitution); (3) the
nondelegation doctrine, (because the legislative veto provision represents
improper delegation of legislative power to a legislative body); or (4) some
combination of the above. Constitutional history and constitutional interpretation in Missouri is not substantially different from constitutional doctrine in
other jurisdictions. The experiences of other states and the analyses applied
in legislative veto cases in other states are relevant for Missouri. Most cases
in other states have dealt with powers exercised by one house or by the whole
legislature. Missouri's legislative veto provisions are especially likely to be
declared unconstitutional because they involve powers exercised by a
committee. The provisions fail under one or more of the constitutional
analyses enumerated above, and additionally flaunt the will of the voters.
The Missouri General Assembly is not without mechanisms to help it
achieve most of the policy goals of supervising a growing bureaucracy. The
original powers granted to the JCAR, giving it "review and recommend"
authority, are adequate to make the bureaucracy more responsive, and when
agencies are uncooperative, the legislature can pass bills to control actions or
rules it believes to be unwise.
At some point the right case will arise challenging the powers of the
JCAR. It should come as no surprise to anyone when those powers are ruled
unconstitutional.
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Appendix AVERSIONS OF THE POWERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES (JCAR)
Several different versions of legislative veto powers granted to the JCAR
are set out below. For each version, or variation of the version, the typical
language of the version is given. This is followed by a list of statutes in
which the language or analogous language can be found. On occasion,
commentary follows, explaining how one version or variation differs from
another.

I. VERSION I - COMPLAINT WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARING COMMISSION

A. Typical Language:
The Committee on Administrative Rules may file a complaint before the
Administrative Hearing Commission contesting the validity of any rule
purportedly promulgated. The Administrative Hearing Commission shall
immediately suspend that portion of the rule which is challenged until the
Commission has determined the matter. The Commission shall hold a
hearing within 10 days of the filing to determine the matter.
Section containing this language:

§ 344.070 - (enacted
Administrators).

1969;

amended

1979)

(Nursing

Home

B. Typical Language:
The Committee on Administrative Rules may file a complaint before the
Administrative Hearing Commission contesting the validity of any rule
purportedly promulgated. The Administrative Hearing Commission shall
immediately suspend that portion of the rule which is challenged until the
Commission has determined the matter unless the issuing Authority, within
3 working days after the receipt of the complaint,files an affidavit with the
Commission stating that the suspension of the rule would terminate
entitlement to Federalfunds being received by the state or any political
subdivision thereof at the time the rule was published.

*The author wishes particularly to thank Beverly Baughman, class of 1992, for her research
assistance on this Appendix.
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Sections containing this language:
§ 198.009
Homes).

-

(enacted 1979) (Convalescent, Nursing and Boarding

§ 630.050 - (enacted 1980) (Department of Mental Health).
Commentary
This Version differs from Version L4 as shown by the italicizedlanguage.
Both Versions appear to be invalidated by State Tax Commission v.
Administrative HearingCommission, 641 S. W.2d 69 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
II. VERSION II - SUSPENSION

4. Typical Language:
Any rule or portion of a rule promulgated may be suspended by the
committee on administrative rules until such time as the general assembly
may by concurrent resolution reinstate such rule.
Sections containing this language:
§ 173.612 - (enacted 1983; amended 1991) (Department of Higher
Education).
§ 191.315 - (enacted 1985) (Health and Welfare).
§ 196.540 - (enacted 1981) (Food and Drugs).
§ 266.091 - (enacted 1951; amended 1957, 1978, 1979) (Seeds,
Fertilizers and Feeds).
§ 301.064 - (enacted 1979; amended 1986) (Registration and Licensing
of Motor Vehicles).
§ 660.130 - (enacted 1979; amended 1980) (Department of Social
Services).
B. Typical Language:
Any rule or portion of a rule promulgated pursuant to this chapter may be
suspended by the joint committee on administrative rules if after hearing
thereon the committee finds that such rule or portion of the rule is beyond
or contrary to the statutory authority of the agency which promulgated the
rule, or is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the authorizing statute.
The general assembly may reinstate such rule by concurrent resolution
signed by the governor.
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Sections containing this language:
§ 8.710 - (enacted 1981) (State Buildings and Lands).
§ 36.070 - (enacted 1945; amended 1979) (State Personnel Law (Merit
System)).
§ 115.011 - (enacted 1977; amended 1981) (Election Authorities and
Conduct of Elections).
§ 116.130 - (enacted 1980; amended 1988) (Initiative and Referendum).
§ 135.150 - (enacted 1980; amended 1986, 1991) (Tax Relief).
§ 135.250 - (enacted 1982; amended 1985, 1986, 1989, 1991) (Tax
Relief).
§ 143.787 - (enacted 1982) (Income Tax Credits and Refunds).
§ 144.010 - (enacted 1939; amended 1941, 1943, 1945, 1947, 1974,
1975, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1985, 1988) (Sales And Use Tax).
§ 147.120 - (enacted 1943; amended 1945, 1969, 1979, 1982, 1983,
1987) (Corporation Franchise Tax).
§ 148.700 - (enacted 1982) (Taxation of Financial Institutions).
§ 162.730 - (enacted 1973; amended 1977, 1981) (School Districts).
§ 170.225 - (enacted 1977; amended 1981) (Instruction-Materials and
Subjects).
§ 173.105 - (enacted 1978; amended 1981) (Department of Higher
Education).
§ 178.895 - (enacted 1988; amended 1990) (Special Schools and
Instruction and Special Districts).
§ 192.650 - (enacted 1983) (Department of Health).
§ 196.872 - (enacted 1980) (Food and Drugs).
§ 197.320 - (enacted 1979) (Medical Treatment Facility Licenses).
§ 207.020 - (enacted 1945; amended 1961, 1965, 1977, 1981, 1982,
1986) (Division of Family Services).
§ 207.021 - (enacted 1981) (Division of Family Services).
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§ 208.162 - (enacted 1981) (Old Age Assistance, Aid to Dependent
Children and General Relief).
§ 208.164 - (enacted 1982) (Old Age Assistance, Aid to Dependent
Children and General Relief).
§ 210.107 - (enacted 1983) (Child Protection And Reformation).
§ 210.506 - (enacted 1982) (Child Protection and Reformation).
§ 217.040 - (enacted 1982; amended 1989) (Department of Corrections).
§ 217.777 - (enacted 1983; amended 1989) (Department of Corrections).
§ 236.415 - (enacted 1979) (Dams, Mills and Electric Power).
§ 259.240 - (enacted 1983) (Oil and Gas Production).
§ 260.035 - (enacted 1972; amended 1980, 1982, 1983,
(Environmental Control).

1985)

§ 260.437 - (enacted 1983) (Environmental Control).
§ 263.275 - (enacted 1982) (Insect Pests and Weeds).

§ 278.080 - (enacted 1943; amended 1961,
Conservation).

1980, 1986)

(Soil

§ 281.030 - (enacted 1974; amended 1977, 1981, 1988) (Pesticides).
§ 286.060 - (enacted 1945; amended 1947, 1980) (Department of Labor
and Industrial Relations).
§ 287.280 - (enacted 1939; amended 1957, 1965, 1974, 1980, 1981)
(Workers' Compensation Law).
§ 287.650 - (enacted 1939; amended 1949, 1961, 1980) (Workers'
Compensation Law).
§ 288.090 - (enacted 1951; amended 1965, 1967, 1972, 1975, 1977,
1980, 1984, 1991) (Employment Security).
§ 288.102 - (enacted 1977; amended 1981) (Employment Security).
§ 301.001 - (enacted 1983) (Registration and Licensing of Motor
Vehicles).
§ 301.130 - (enacted 1939; amended 1947, 1949, 1951, 1969, 1977,
1981, 1983, 1986, 1987) (Registration and Licensing of Motor Vehicles).
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§ 304.200 - (enacted 1939; amended 1943, 1949, 1972, 1979, 1983,
1985, 1988, 1989) (Traffic Regulations).
§ 307.366 - (enacted 1983; amended 1984, 1988) (Vehicle Equipment
Regulations).
§ 307.395 - (enacted 1979) (Vehicle Equipment Regulations).
§ 313.065 - (enacted 1981) (Bingo-Lottery-Horse Racing).
§ 321.690 - (enacted 1977; amended 1981, 1986, 1991) (Fire Protection
Districts).
§ 331.030 - (enacted 1939; amended 1945, 1947, 1949, 1969, 1981,
1988) (Chiropractors).
§ 333.265 - (enacted 1977; amended 1981) (Embalmers and Funeral
Directors).
1983)
(Physicians and
§ 334.706 - (enacted
Surgeons-Therapists-Athletic Trainers-Health Care Providers).
1981,
§ 337.050 - (enacted 1977; amended
(Psychologists-Professional Counselors-Social Workers).

1989)

§ 348.075 - (enacted 1981) (Authorities and Corporations for Economic
and Technological Development).
§ 361.095 - (enacted 1955; amended 1967, 1980) (Division of Finance
and Powers of Director of Finance).
§ 364.155 - (enacted 1984) (Credit Financing Institutions).
§ 369.367 - (enacted 1982) (Savings and Loan Associations).
§ 374.710 - (enacted 1983) (Department of Insurance).
§ 376.423 - (enacted 1990) (Life and Accident Insurance).
§ 376.380 - (enacted 1939; amended 1943, 1947, 1959, 1961, 1965,
1971, 1975, 1979, 1982) (Life and Accident Insurance).
§ 376.442 - (enacted 1985) (Life and Accident Insurance).
§ 376.779 - (enacted 1977; amended 1980, 1985) (Life and Accident
Insurance).
§ 376.781 - (enacted 1984) (Life and Accident Insurance).
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§ 385.045 - (enacted 1977; amended 1981) (Credit Life and Accident
Insurance).
§ 386.250 - (enacted 1939; amended 1963, 1967, 1977, 1980, 1987,
1988, 1991) (Public Service Commission).
§ 392.330 - (enacted 1939; amended 1980, 1987) (Telephone and
Telegraph Companies).
§ 407.145 - (enacted 1986) (Merchandising Practices).
§ 408.580 - (enacted 1979) (Legal Tender and Interest).
§ 409.419 - (enacted 1977; amended 1981) (Regulation of Securities).
§ 411.070 - (enacted 1941; amended 1955, 1965, 1977, 1980, 1986)
(Missouri Grain Warehouse Law).
§ 411.765 - (enacted 1977; amended 1981) (Missouri Grain Warehouse
Law).
§ 414.142 - (enacted 1987) (Inspection of Oils).
§ 416.490 - (enacted 1959; amended 1963, 1982) (Monopolies,
Discriminations and Conspiracies).
§ 444.530 - (enacted 1971; amended 1983, 1990) (Rights and Duties of
Miners and Mine Owners).
§ 444.800 - (enacted 1979; amended 1987) (Rights and Duties of Miners
and Mine Owners).
§ 454.405 - (enacted 1982; amended 1984, 1986, 1990) (Enforcement of
Support Law).
§ 577.051 - (enacted 1982) (Public Safety Offenses).
§ 595.060 - (enacted 1981) (Victims of Crimes, Compensation and
Services).
§ 620.125 - (enacted 1981) (Department of Economic Development).
§ 620.990 - (enacted 1983) (Department of Economic Development).
§ 630.210 - (enacted 1980; amended 1981, 1982) (Department of Mental
Health).
§ 640.100 - (enacted 1939; amended 1978, 1981, 1982, 1988, 1989)
(Department of Natural Resources).
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§ 643.055 - (enacted 1979) (Air Conservation).
§ 660.200 - (enacted 1979; amended 1981) (Department of Social
Services).
§ 660.418 - (enacted 1984) (Department of Social Services).
§ 700.115 - (enacted 1976; amended 1978, 1982, 1984) (Manufactured
Homes (Mobile Homes)).
Bills passed by the 86th General Assembly 2d Regular Session 1992:
HB 899 - Medicaid Drug Prior Authorization
SB 465 - Missouri Vehicle Safety Inspection
SB 544 - Air Conservation

SB 626 - Unemployment Compensation Fund
SB 698 - Certain Health Insurance Policies
Commentary
Version IIB above differs from Version IIA in that a hearingis required
before a rule may be suspended. It also appears that in order for the
suspension of a rule to occur it must be "beyond or contraryto the statutory
authority of the agency" or "inconsistent with the legislative intent of the
authorizing statute." As will be seen in the later versions of the legislative
veto, the requirementthat suspension occur only if the conditions mentioned
above are met is eliminated.
III. VERSION III - PuRE PRIOR APPROVAL
A. Typical Language:
No rule or part of a rule promulgated pursuant to this act shall become
effective until approved by the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules.

Sections containing this language:
§ 197.445 - (enacted 1983) (Medical Treatment Facility Licenses).
§ 253.035 - (enacted 1961; amended 1967, 1983) (State Parks and
Historic Preservation).
§§ 260.500 & 260.520 - (enacted 1983) (Environmental Control).
§ 266.355 - (enacted 1983) (Seeds, Fertilizers and Feeds).
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§ 301.144 - (enacted 1977; amended 1979, 1983, 1984, 1989)
(Registration and Licensing of Motor Vehicles).
Bills passed by the 86th General Assembly 2d Regular Session 1992:
SB 607 - Registration of Motor Vehicles.
Commentary
This language requiresprior approval only. It does not contain a nonseverabilityclause or any other conditions. In some instances language that
was pureprior approval has been amended by recent legislation changing it
to Version IVB or IVC. For example, in SB 496 passed by the 86th General
Assembly in 1992, § 197.445 was amended. In the newer version, a nonseverabilityclause was added to the prior approval language.
IV. VERSION IV - PRIOR APPROVAL WITH OTHER REQUIREMENTS
A. Typical language:
Any rule or portion of a rule promulgated and approved under any authority
in this section may be suspended by the Joint Committee on Administrative
Rules at any time. No rule or portion of a rule promulgated under any
authority granted in this section shall become effective until it has been
approved by the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules. If the Joint
Committee on Administrative Rules neither approves nor disapproves a rule
within thirty days after the notice of proposed rulemaking has been
published in the Missouri Register, the rule shall stand approved. In the
event that the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules disapproves or
suspends a rule, the Joint Committee shall notify both the department or
agency proposing the rule and the Secretary of State. The Secretary of
State shall publish in the Missouri Register as soon as practicable an order
withdrawing the rule.
Sections containing this language:
§ 277.160 - (enacted 1989) (Missouri Livestock Marketing Law).
§ 622.027 - (enacted 1985) (Division of Transportation).
Commentary
This appearsto be the only remainingsection in which such language is
found. It does not contain the non-severability clause that is found in all
other versions ofIV This languagewas originallyfound in the lottery statute
(§ 313.220), but was amended in 1988, thus changing it to Version IVC.
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B. Typical Language:
Any rule or portion of a rule promulgated and approved under any authority
of [this act, section, chapter] may be suspended by the Joint Committee on
Administrative Rules at any time. No rule or portion of a rule promulgated
under any authority granted in this [act, section, chapter] shall become
effective until it has been approved by the Joint Committee on
Administrative Rules. If the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules
neither approves nor disapproves a rule within thirty days after the notice
of proposed rulemaking has been published in the Missouri Register, the
rule shall stand approved.
In the event the Joint Committee on
Administrative Rules disapproves or suspends a rule, the Joint Committee
shall notify both the department or agency proposing the rule and Secretary
of State. The Secretary of State shall publish in the Missouri Register as
soon as practicable an order withdrawing the rule. The provisions of this
chapter are non-severable and the grant of rulemaking authority is
essentiallydependent on the reviewpower vested with the Joint Committee
on Administrative Rules. If the review power is held unconstitutional or
invalid, the grant of rulemaking authority shall also be invalid or void.
Sections containing this language:
§ 135.285 - (enacted 1986) (Tax Relief).
§ 135.339 - (enacted 1987) (Tax Relief).
§ 160.272 - (enacted 1985) (Schools-General Provisions).
§ 178.673 - (enacted 1984) (Special Schools and Instruction and Special
Districts).
§ 190.249 - (enacted 1987) (Emergency Services).
§ 193.325 - (enacted 1984) (Vital Statistics).
§ 197.221 - (enacted 1978; amended 1986) (Medical Treatment Facility
Licenses).
§ 210.545 - (enacted 1987) (Child Protection and Reformation).
§ 213.106 - (enacted 1986) (Human Rights).
§ 256.640 - (enacted 1985) (Geology, Water Resources and Geodetic
Survey).
§ 263.150 - (enacted 1939; amended 1984) (Insect Pests and Weeds).
§ 264.095 - (enacted 1985) (Apiaries).
§ 266.341 - (enacted 1953; amended 1959, 1985) (Seeds, Fertilizers and
Feeds).
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§ 276.626 - (enacted 1987) (Stockyards, Grain and Produce Exchanges).
§ 301.002 - (enacted 1986) (Registration and Licensing of Motor
Vehicles).
§ 302.765 - (enacted 1989) (Drivers' and CommercialDrivers' Licenses).
§ 306.465 - (enacted 1987) (WatercraftRegulations and Licensing-State
Water Patrol).
§ 307.173 - (enacted 1985; amended 1987) (Vehicle Equipment
Regulations).
§ 307.400 - (enacted 1984; amended 1986, 1988, 1991) (Vehicle
Equipment Regulations).
§ 319.137 - (enacted 1989) (General Safety Requirements).
§ 326.110 - (enacted 1943; amended 1977, 1981, 1984) (Accountants).
§ 327.609 - (enacted 1989) (Architects, Professional Engineers and Land
Surveyors).
§ 329.210 - (enacted 1939; amended 1945, 1949, 1981,
(Cosmetologists, Hairdressers and Manicurists).

1987)

1989)
(Physicians and
§ 334.743 - (enacted
Surgeons-Therapists-Athletic Trainers-Health Care Providers).
§ 335.259 - (enacted 1990) (Nurses).
§ 336.220 - (enacted 1981; amended 1986) (Optometrists).
§ 337.520 - (enacted 1985; amended 1989) (Psychologists-Professional
Counselors-Social Workers).
§ 337.627 - (enacted 1989)
Counselors-Social Workers).

(Psychologists-Professional

§ 361.727 - (enacted 1984) (Director of Finance and Powers of Director
of Finance).
§ 379.893 - (enacted 1987) (Insurance Other Than Life).
§ 389.005 - (enacted 1988) (Regulation of Railroad Corporations).
§ 409.806 - (enacted 1985) (Regulation of Securities).
§ 454.400 - (enacted 1982; amended 1985, 1986, 1990) (Enforcement of
Support Law).
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§ 454.465 - (enacted 1982; amended 1984, 1986) (Enforcement of
Support Law).
§ 536.073 - (enacted 1957; amended 1985, 1989) (Administrative
Procedure and Review).
§ 558.041 - (enacted 1983; amended 1986, 1990) (Imprisonment).
§ 577.530 - (enacted 1987) (Public Safety Offenses).
§ 650.215 - (enacted 1984; amended 1990) (Department of Public
Safety).
§ 660.070 - (enacted 1987) (Department of Social Services).
§ 701.033 - (enacted 1986) (State Standards).
Bills passed by the 86th General Assembly 2d Regular Session 1992:
HB 878 - Disposition of Animal Carcasses
HB 1376 - Licensing of Land Surveys
C. Typical Language:
No rule or portion of a rule promulgated under the authority of this [act,
section, chapter] shall become effective until it has been approved by the
joint committee on administrative rules. Upon filing any proposed rule with
the secretary of state, the department shall concurrently submit such
proposed rule to the committee which may hold hearings upon any
proposed rule or portion thereof at any time. In the event the committee
disapproves any proposed rule or portion thereof, the committee shall notify
the department and the secretary of state. If any proposed rule or portion
thereof is disapproved by the committee, the secretary of the state shall
publish in the Missouri Register, as soon as practicable, an order that such
rule or portion thereof has been disapproved.
The department shall not file any final order of rulemaking with the
secretary of state until twenty days after such final order of rulemaking has
been received by the committee. The committee may hold one or more
hearings upon such final order of rulemaking during the twenty-day period.
If the committee neither approves nor disapproves any order of rulemaking
within the twenty-day period, the department may file such order of
rulemaking with the secretary of state and the order of rulemaking shall be
deemed approved, subject to subsequent suspension by the committee. In
the event the committee disapproves any order of rulemaking or portion
thereof, the committee shall notify the department and the secretary of state.
Any rule or portion of a rule promulgated under the authority of this
[act, section, chapter] may be suspended by the committee at any time after
a hearingconducted thereon. If any rule is suspended by the committee,
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the secretary of state shall publish in the Missouri Register, as soon as
practicable, an order withdrawing the rule.
Any person seeking judicial review of any such rule shall be deemed

to have exhausted all administrative review procedures. Notwithstanding
the provisions of section 1.140, RSMo, the provisions of this [act, section,
chapter] are nonseverable and the grant of rulemaking authority is
essentially dependent on the review power vested with the committee. If
the review power is held unconstitutional or invalid, the grant of rulemaking
authority and any rule promulgated under such rulemaking authority shall

also be invalid or void.

Sections containing this language include:
§ 32.125 - (enacted 1977; amended 1981, 1990) (State Department of
Revenue).
§ 109.221 - (enacted 1989; amended 1990) (Public and Business
Records).
§ 135.359 - (enacted 1990; amended 1991) (Tax Relief).
§ 173.619 - (enacted 1991) (Department of Higher Education).
§ 191.695 - (enacted 1988) (Health and Welfare).
§ 199.029 - (enacted 1991) (Missouri Rehabilitation Center (Formerly
Chest Hospital)).
§ 210.145 - (enacted 1975; amended 1980, 1982, 1986, 1990) (Child
Protection and Reformation).
§ 210.196 - (enacted 1991) (Child Protection and Reformation).
§ 260.225 - (enacted 1972; amended 1975, 1986,
(Environmental Control).

1988, 1990)

§ 260.370 - (enacted 1977; amended 1980, 1988) (Environmental
Control).
§ 313.220 - (enacted 1985; amended 1988) (Public Safety and Morals).
§ 335.209 - (enacted 1990) (Nurses).
§ 338.035 - (enacted 1990) (Pharmacists and Pharmacies).
§ 339.543 - (enacted 1990) (Real Estate Agents, Brokers and Appraisers).
§ 374.515 - (enacted 1991) (Department of Insurance).
§ 376.814 - (enacted 1991) (Life and Accident Insurance).
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§ 376.982 - (enacted 1990) (Life and Accident Insurance).
§ 444.767 - (enacted 1971; amended 1990) (Rights and Duties of Miners
and Mine Owners).
§ 590.120 - (enacted 1978; amended 1988) (Selection and Training of
Peace Officers).
§ 620.010 - (enacted 1973; amended 1981, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1990)
(Department of Economic Development).
§ 660.512 - (enacted 1989) (Department of Social Services).
§ 660.534 - (enacted: 1990) (Department of Social Services).
Bills passed by the 86th General Assembly 2d Regular Session 1992:
HB 878 - Disposition of Animal Carcasses
HB 1434 & 1490 - Regaining Possession of Property
HB 1574 - State Employee Health Care Plan
HB 1736 - Election Procedures

SB 449 - Nutrition and Hunger
SB 494 - Motorcycle Education and Licensing
SB 496 - Discrimination Against Practitioners
SB 544 - Air Conservation

SB 573 & 634 - Abuse of the Elderly
SB 611 - Immunization of Pupils

SB 636 - Animal Health Care Standards
Commentary
The primary differences between Versions IVB and IVC above is the
invalidation of both rulemaking and rules in IVC, and the addition of a
required hearing before suspension of an existing rule. There are in fact
several other differences andvariationsin both IVB andIVC. However, these
differences relate primarily to the procedures that must be followed when
submitting rules to the JCAR.
For example, the following statutory sections have no provision that the
rules be concurrently submitted to the JCAR, and they also allow the JCAR
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in its discretion to hold one or more hearings on the proposed rule:
§§ 208.151, 292.613, 301.575, 338.350, 643.210.
In addition, several bills enacted in 1992 provide that an agency
promulgatingany rule, or amendment of a rule, or final order of rulemaking
shallfile such notice of proposed rulemaking with the JCAR. These bills
include HB 995, HB 1199, HB 1574, HB 1736, HB 1744 and HB 1393.
The more recentgrants of the legislative veto power seem to be designed
to insure that the JCAR has time to rejectanyfinal order of rulemaking before
it is published. The requirementof a hearingbefore suspension in IVC is not
alwaysfound in the language.
V. VERSION V - OTHER VARIATIONS

A. Typical Language
The following language is included in a bill passed in 1992 (SB 796 Health Care Coverage). Interestingly enough, this bill contained two sets of
language setting forth the more detailed version of IVC above in addition to
the less detailed language set out below:
Any rule or portion of a rule promulgated pursuant to section 1 to 13 of
this act may be suspended by the committee on administrative rules if, after
hearing thereon, the committee finds that such rule or portion of the rule is
beyond or contrary to the statutory authority of the director or is
inconsistent with the legislative intent of the authorizing statute. The
general assembly may reinstate such rule by concurrent resolution signed
by the Governor.
Any person seeking judicial review of any such rule shall be deemed
to have exhausted all administrative review procedures. Notwithstanding
the provisions of section 1.140, RSMo, the provisions of this section are
nonseverable and the grant of rulemaking authority is essentially dependent
on the review power vested with the committee on administrative rules. If
the review power is held unconstitutional or invalid, the grant of rulemaking
authority, and any rule promulgated under such rulemaking authority, shall
also be invalid or void.

Commentary
This first paragraph harkens back to the earliersuspension language
(Version iB) which provided standardsfor JCAR action and which was not
incorporatedin later statutes. However, this Version adds in the second
paragraphthe newer language relatingto non-severability.
B. Typical Language
Recent legislation creating the Missouri Ethics Commission (SB 262
(1991), MO. REV. STAT. § 105.955 (1991 Supp.)) contains unusual language
at § 105.955.16(1) which provides that an advisory opinion issued by the
commission:
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shall be withdrawn by the commission if, after hearing thereon, the joint
committee on administrative rules finds that such advisory opinion is
beyond or contrary to the statutory authority of the commission or is
inconsistent with the legislative intent of any laws enacted by the general
assembly, and after the general assembly, by concurrent resolution, votes
to adopt the findings and conclusions of the joint committee on
administrative rules.
Commentary
This unusual grant of power to the JCAR appears to be only a slight
enhancement of its original § 536.037 "review and recommend" authority.
The JCAR recommendation must be adopted by the General Assembly by
concurrentresolution.
C. Typical Language
Another unusual provision appears in HB 321 passed in 1989 and
codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 444.380 (1991 Supp.), concerning rules and
regulations that the Director of the Department of Natural Resources may
adopt under the Metallic Minerals Waste Management Act. The provisions of
the act are "nonseverable for purposes of this section and the grant of
rulemaking authority is totally dependent on the power vested with the joint
committee on administrative rules."
Commentary
The use ofthe word "totally"in place of "essentially"appearsonly in this
section.
D. Typical Language
A definition of the "cost of education index" set out in "State Aid
Definitions,! Mo. REV. STAT. § 163.011(3) (1991 Supp.), declares that "[a]ny
rule proposed pursuant to this section shall be submitted to the [JCAR] which
shall review and report on the rule as provided in section 536.037, RSMo."
Commentary
This appears to be the only section that refers only to § 536.037 JCAR
powers.
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